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Economic sanctions have been a long-standing policy
instrument used by the United States. While much research has
been conducted on the effectiveness of sanctions, little has
been written on whether governments anticipate economic
sanctions and take measures to protect assets held in foreign
countries. Using Iraq as a case study, this thesis uses
publicly available U.S. Government-collected information to
track the flow of foreign financial data within the United
States to determine if it is possible it identify events which
may indicate that a country is attempting to protect its
foreign assets in anticipation of economic sanctions. The
thesis concludes that Iraq did not anticipate U.S. imposed
economic sanctions prior to invading Kuwait in August 1990,
and that financial data collected by various U.S. Government
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The United States has used economic sanctions as a foreign
policy tool with increasing frequency over the last two
decades. From World War I through 1969 a total of 26 U.S.
initiated sanction incidents occurred. From 1970 to 1992 the
United States used sanctions in over 100 cases (Hufbauer,
1990, pp. 16-24) (CRS, 1992, pp. v-vii) . This increase in the
use of sanctions highlights several key issues that have been
the focus of the literature on sanctions: the scope and
variety of economic sanctions, the usefulness of sanctions as
a policy tool and the purpose of imposing sanctions.
The intent of this thesis, however, is to explore two
additional issues that have received insufficient attention in
the literature on economic sanctions. These issues may have
implications for future economic intelligence gathering and
governmental data collection as the U.S. government moves away
from an emphasizing Soviet issues in favor of tackling new
problems, including economic intelligence, nuclear
proliferation and technology transfer (Bush, 1991, p. 1)
.
First, it must be asked, is it possible to determine if
foreign governments anticipate sanctions? Secondly, is it
possible to track the flow and ownership of foreign
investments and commercial transactions in the United States
in order to identify unusual activity or measures a country
may take to protect its assets? In other words, can foreign
powers about to engage in hostile or potentially unacceptable
action adequately protect their holdings in advance of that
action; and can the flow of foreign investments and business
transactions in the United States be tracked and used as an
indicator of pending actions? These issues will be explored
in detail by determining whether Iraq anticipated economic
sanctions and if Saddam Hussein took precautionary measures to
protect financial assets prior to the imposition of sanctions
in August 1990
.
While the focus of this thesis is on Iraq, there is
already a case where a leader did anticipate sanctions to
protect assets. According to press reports, Libya anticipated
possible U.N. economic sanctions for failing to hand over two
agents accused of bombing a Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie,
Scotland. Libya withdrew vast sums of money from European
banks and forwarded those funds to financial institutions in
the Arab world. The shift of between $2 billion and $3
billion occurred in the few months before U.N. sanctions were
imposed on 15 April 1991. During this timeframe, Libya also
demanded payment for its oil exports in Swiss francs, instead
of U.S. dollars. The Libians deviated from their normal
practice of accempting U.S. currency to minimize the number of
transactions which had to be cleared through U.S. banks, where
Tripoli feared the funds would be vulnerable to seizure.
(Little Johns, 1992, p. 1.)
B. HYPOTHESIS
The working hypothesis of this paper is Saddam Hussein
anticipated economic sanctions against him prior to invading
Kuwait in August 1990 and took precautionary measures to
protect Iraqi assets held in the United States. The
hypothesis posits that it is possible to track the flow of
financial data in press reports and U.S. government reports to
make such a determination before a unilateral or multilateral
decision to impose sanctions occurs.
C . METHODOLOGY
Information compiled from surveys, press reporting and
personal interviews will be used to determine whether Iraq
altered its financial position with the United States prior to
invading Kuwait and if it were feasible to track associated
financial data flows. For the purpose of this thesis, sources
of information were limited to government organizations,
banking agencies and press reporting. Sources were selected
based on an initial telephone interview process to determine
whether an organization held relevant material. Organizations
found to maintain pertinent data were the Department of
Commerce, Department of Treasury, Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Questionnaires were sent
to these organizations.
Questionnaires were developed to determine the type of
information pertaining to Iraqi financial and business
transactions in the United States held by government agencies
and whether that information was readily available for
independent analysis (Appendix A contains specific questions
and responses) . Other public and private organizations
including Congressional committees, the Library of Congress,
the State Department, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, the Wisconsin Project and the Institute for
International Economics provided extremely useful background
information
.
The types of sanctions that have been employed in the past
were identified to develop a set of actions that countries
normally take when they invoke sanctions against other
countries. Additionally, potential target country responses
to potential sanctions were postulated. These actions were
condensed into seven questions that form the basis for




Chapter II examines Iraq's recent economic history during
the period from 1970 to 1987. Due to limited public
information available after 1987, some projections are
presented for 1988 to 1990. Basic background data on Iraq, a
description of the Iraqi economy and a discussion of major
economic policies implemented by Saddam Hussein are documented
to explain the U.S. relationship with Iraq and the economic
motivations behind Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait.
Chapter III contains theoretical information on economic
sanctions, discusses the types of sanctions used by the United
States and the success of sanction actions imposed against
Iraq. This chapter also lays the foundation for analysis by
outlining four major financial sanction options the United
States could have used against Iraq.
Chapter IV analyzes data obtained through media reporting
and U.S. government agencies to determine if the government of
Iraq changed its financial and trade position with the United
States prior to invading Kuwait. This chapter also documents
the type of unclassified information that is available through
U.S. government and U.S. bank sources.
Chapter V presents findings and recommendations.
II. THE IRAQI ECONOMY
A. INTRODUCTION
Within the last two decades, the military actions of Iraq
have had a noticeable impact on world affairs and U.S.
policies. For example, one reason the United States may have
adopted an economically supportive policy toward Iraq during
the Iran-Iraq war was the hope that Saddam Hussein would
counter-balance a potentially over bearing Iran. The United
States also wanted to encourage Saddam Hussein to be a
moderate stable influence in the Middle East region.
Although Iraq holds much of its military and economic
information as State secrets, an overview of the Iraqi
economic system and major economic policies will assist in
understanding Iraq's financial transactions prior to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
Iraq's move in the 1980' s toward privatization and
diversification of the economy may also help explain U.S.
policy in dealing with Iraq, the type of goods Iraq imported
from the United States and why Iraq may have been less
susceptible to economic sanctions imposed by the United
States. Additionally, Saddam Hussein's economic goal of
transforming Iraq from a lesser developed country (LDC) into
a modern nation, combined with the fact that his economy was
severely weakened by the eight year war with Iran, may have
been a contributing factor to his decision to invade Kuwait in
August 1990. A quick fix to some of his economic woes would
have resulted from the increased revenues obtained by
controlling additional Kuwaiti oil facilities and free access
to the Persian Gulf.
B . BACKGROUND
1 . Geography and Population
Iraq, with a total land area of between 433,970 and
437,520 (estimates differ) square kilometers, is bounded by
Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, Kuwait to the south,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan to the southwest and Syria to the
northwest . The country can be divided into four main
geographic regions. The west and southwest portions of the
country are predominantly desert. Rolling uplands
characterize the north central region between the upper Tigres
and Euphrates Rivers. Highlands cover the north and
northeast. The central and southeast areas are considered
alluvial plains through which the Tigres and Euphrates Rivers
flow. Over one fifth of the country's land mass is farmland.
This predominantly Muslim Shiite and Sunni nation
realized a steady increase in population, despite the Iran-
Iraq War. Estimated census totals were 12.029 million in
1977, 15.6 million in 1984 and 16.278 million in 1987. (Metz,
1990. p. 79) A flight from rural areas to the cities resulted
in urban populations comprising 61 percent, 64 percent and 70
percent of the total for 1977, 1984 and 1987, respectively.
(Metz, 1990, p. 79)
2. Politics
Saddam Hussein has been the central figure in Iraqi
politics and government since his calculated rise to power,
which began after the 1968 Revolution. Initially, Saddam
Hussein was an influential behind-the-scenes leader and
displayed talents as an effective Baath party politician. He
was particularly adept at organizing clandestine opposition
activity and eliminating opponents. By 1977, all Baath party
bureaus, intelligence organizations and ministers reported
directly to him. In 1979, Iraqi President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr
appeared on television on the eleventh anniversary of his rise
to power to announce his retirement and his successor, Saddam
Hussein (Karsh, 1991, p. Ill) . Saddam Hussein consolidated
power during the next nine years, becoming President of the
Republic, Secretary of the Baath Party, Regional Command
Council (RCC) Chairman and Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces. (Metz, 1990, p. xvii) The RCC exercises both
executive and legislative functions. With a strong desire to
ensure his total and absolute control over every sphere of
political life, Saddam Hussein became the ultimate decision
maker for all political and economic policies.
By the late-1970's, Saddam Hussein strived to
strengthen his popularity by improving the economy. He
attempted to accomplish this through a state sponsored
industrial modernization policy. His stated objectives were
to effect a wider distribution of wealth, permit greater
social mobility and redistribute land for the Iraqi people.
He planned to conserve money to achieve these goals by cutting
costs of direct and indirect government subsidies, tapping
private sector savings to stem capital outlays, reducing the
balance of payments deficit by fostering import substitution
and promoting exports and using economic reforms to convince
Western commercial creditors to continue to loan Iraq money.
3. Iran-Iraq War
The Iran-Iraq War officially began in September 1980
when Iraqi troops marched into Iranian territory and Saddam
Hussein announced he was abrogating the 1975 Algiers Agreement
by returning Shatt al Arab to Iraqi sovereignty (Farouk-
Sluglett, 1987, p. 259) . However, hostilities were noted as
early as June 1979 when an Iraqi air raid across the Iranian
border killed six men. Skirmishes along the border increased
during the intervening period between June 1979 and September
1980. A cease fire occurred in August 1988 and a negotiated
settlement with Iran followed.
Several reasons may have led Saddam Hussein to invade
Iran. Iraq had minimal access to the Persian Gulf and wanted
more. There was a longstanding disagreement over territories
as well as a religious hatred among Iraqis and Iranians.
After the Shah of Iran was overthrown in February 1979, Saddam
believed Iran's military was unprepared for war and he could
militarily annex Iran with little to no cost in money or
manpower
.
His decision to invade may have been a personal
miscalculation based on ambition and a misplaced sense of
Iranian vulnerability. Regardless, failure to win a swift and
decisive victory greatly weakened Saddam's political and
economic regime and resulted in over a one percent population
loss (approximately 200,000 men). (Farouk-Sluglett, 1987, p.
262)
Specific effects of the War are discussed in
subsequent sections. Generally, however, Iraq's war with
Iran slowed the growth rate of productive elements of the
economy. From 1980 through 1984, Iraq suffered a negative
growth rate of six percent (Hilal, 1987, p. 25) .
Additionally, it cost Iraq over U.S. $25 million daily to wage
the war (Metz, 1990, p. 123) . The direct cost of the war from
1980 to 1985 is estimated at U.S. $226 billion (Metz, 1990, p.
121) . Major economic impacts of the war are highlighted in
Table 1 (Joffe, 1988, p. 24)
.
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Table 1: VARIOUS COST ESTIMATES OF IRAN-IRAQ WAR
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Nasrawi - Dr. Nasrawi, Vermont University.
JIME - Japanese Institute of Middle East Economies.
Tachibana/Tsu ji - "The Reconstruction of Iran and Iraq," JIME, Tokyo 1988.
Mufid - "The Economic Consequences of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-mid 1987,"
paper presented at The Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, January
1988.
EIU - Economic Intelligence Unit
IISS - International Institute of Strategic Studies.
Sipri - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Washington - Petroleum Finance Corporation.
4. Post Iran-Iraq War to Pre-Kuwait Invasion
Eight years of war with Iran left Saddam Hussein's
regime with a substantial military establishment, a still
unbridled ambition to lead the Arab world and an enormous
public debt. In 1988, Iraqi foreign debt was estimated at
between $60 and $80 billion. War had reduced Iraq's estimated
reserves from approximately $30 to $8.1 billion or less.
(Joffe, 1988, p. 28) Because of Iraq's huge and growing




By the end of 1989 and into 1990, Saddam Hussein was
running out of cash. He was routinely defaulting on loans
despite having the second largest oil reserve in the world.
In mid-1990 (prior to invading Kuwait), Saddam Hussein asked
Egypt, Jordan and Yemen for $30 billion in loans. He wanted
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to write-off an additional $30 billion
in loan debt (Barber, 1991, p. 2) . By July 1990, Iraq accused
unnamed Gulf States of crippling Iraq's economic recovery by
driving down oil prices. He specifically accused Kuwait of
stealing Iraqi oil and demanded compensation for lost oil
revenues and additional financial assistance for Iraq's
economic reconstruction.
Saddam Hussein' s political fervor increased again
during July, espousing a long standing belief that Kuwait is
really part of Iraq. He also made major concessions in the
Iranian peace settlement, relinquishing undisputed control of
Shatt-al-Arab waterway to Iran. These two events may have
indicated that he was looking to Kuwait for free access to the
Persian Gulf. (Middle East , 1990, p. 6) By 1 August 1990,
talks between Iraq and Kuwait collapsed and Iraqi troops
massed along the Kuwaiti border. Iraqi forces crossed into
Kuwait on 2 August, quickly gaining control of the country.
( Middle East , 1990 p. 24) Iraq's dire economic situation and
unanswered requests for money may have provided significant
impetus to his decision to invade Kuwait.
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C. MAJOR ECONOMIC GOALS
1. General
Iraq has a centrally planned economy with a dominant
public sector. By 1970, all important branches of industrial
production were under government ownership. Despite rapid
modernization, Iraq is still largely underdeveloped (Hilal,
1987, p. 24) . According to Batie Khalifa Hilal, a major
policy issue in "the field of economic growth... is how to
bring about a simultaneous expansion in both agriculture and
industry that would reduce oil as the main source of foreign
exchange earnings." (Hilal, 1987, p. 1) This is especially
difficult since oil is the catalyst for growth in the Iraqi
economy
.
Iraq suffers from problems common to underdeveloped
nations. The social backwardness and lack of educated and
trained workers as well as a structural defect of production
methods decrease the rate of economic growth and development.
(Hilal, 1987, p. 19)
From 1960 through 1980, the government designed
comprehensive five-year plans (considered state secrets) to
improve the economy. The primary goal of these plans was to
reduce dependency on oil through economic diversity. These
plans separated annual expenditures into three major
categories: annual expenditure budget for government
13
operations, annual investment budget to achieve the goals of
the five year plans and annual import budget.
2 . The Five Year Plans
The first Five Year Plan covered the period 1960 to
1964. The Plan emphasized agricultural and industrial
development. The next Plan, in effect from 1965 to 1969,
actually raised the standard of living among the citizenry.
Iraq accelerated the economic growth rate, diversified away
from oil with more resources committed to investment and
production and encouraged growth in the industrial and
agriculture sectors through development of commodity markets .
From 1970 to 1974, the Plan focused on labor efficiency,
foreign trade, research and development and expanding
investment. The Plan stressed coordination and balance
between investment and savings policies and consumption and
development needs. Nationalization of the oil industry
occurred in 1972.
The 1975 to 1980 Plan concentrated on industrial
development and diversification. In 1975, over 10.7 million
Iraqi Dinar (ID), or 42 percent of the budget, was allocated
for industry (Hilal, 1987, p. 42) . The government tried to
reduce dependence on oil, develop alternative exports, enhance
processing of the country's raw materials, increase local
manufacturing to satisfy increased domestic consumption needs,
improve agriculture production and expand education.
14
Successful realization of these goals would have made Iraq
less dependent on oil revenues and more self-sufficient. Due
to an oil revenue windfall, economic policies for this period
were merely concerned with the redistribution of wealth and
modernization of the infrastructure. No concern was given to
economic efficiency.
The next Plan (1981 to 1990) was suspended due to the
Iran-Iraq War which brought central planning in Iraq to an
impasse. Limited resources for economic expansion and deficit
spending, because of the war effort, were new problems faced
by Saddam Hussein who never formulated the Fifth Five Year
Plan. To cope with the economic burden of war, Saddam
implemented significant market oriented reforms to reduce
government intervention and move closer to an open market
system.
The year 1987 marked a new era of economic reforms in
Iraq and an increasingly closer economic relationship with the
United States. Saddam said, "From now on, the state should
not embark on uneconomic activity." (Hilal, 1987, p. 129)
The Iraqi economy moved dramatically toward privatization of
previously state-owned enterprises including industry,
services, agriculture and factories. However, the most
important source of revenue, oil, was still under almost
complete State control. In 1989, Iraq planned for higher oil
production in order to develop new state controlled industries
to supply the military, civilian and export markets. Iraq's
15
ambitious plans included government sponsored construction of
oil refineries, petrochemical complexes, steel and aluminum
plants, vehicle assembly and expansion of its indigenous
defense industry. These plans were thwarted due to lack of
funding and lower oil prices.
D. ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PRODUCTS
1 . Policy Trends
Iraqi economic policy trends may be divided into three
time periods. The 1970' s were marked by dominant government
control over industry and a growing bureaucracy with
restrictive economic policies. Throughout the early and mid-
1980' s there appeared to be a slight move toward reduced
governmental intervention. In 1986, probably due to the
economic constraints suffered during the Iran-Iraq war, major
reforms occurred. Increased privatization, less government
control and a trend toward a more open market economy
highlighted this period. The state's commitment to
modernization and its substantial oil revenues generated
opportunities for private business. Because most firms
lacked the ability to carry out major infrastructure and high
technology endeavors, sub-contracting became extremely
profitable. (Farouk-Sluglett , 1990, p. 22)
Each major portion of the Iraqi economy was effected
by the Five Year Plans. A chronology of economic growth,
policy and policy analysis is provided for the Gross Domestic
16
Product (GDP), Oil Industry, Non-oil Industry, Agriculture,
Transportation and Trade.
2. Gross Domestic Product
The following Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures
contained in Figure 1 and Table 2 show major trends for the
years 1970 to 1988 (National Accounts Statistics, 1991, p.
870)
.
Overall the economy expanded, albeit at a slower rate
than Iraq expected due to the Iran-Iraq War. The huge growth
in oil revenues gave Saddam the power to ensure the
government's preeminent role within the economy. The State
was the main investor as well as customer of local and
international private capital and was the main generator of
investment opportunities. (Farouk-Sluglett, 1987, p. 253)
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Figure 1: Gross Domestic Product Chart
3. Oil, Mining and Quarry
Oil, mining and quarry account for the majority of the
Iraqi economy, with crude oil providing most of the revenues.
Other goods produced include natural gas, sulfur, stones,
soil, salt and phosphate.
By 1975, all foreign interests in the oil industry
were nationalized. Increased oil prices of the late 1970's
resulted in skyrocketing revenues. Iraq used the money to
expand its oil industry and improve its oil-producing
infrastructure. In 1976, a new Ministry of Oil was
18
established to direct planning and construction in the
petroleum sector and to accept responsibility for all facets
of production. Between 1977 and 1987, 67 oil related
infrastructure projects were completed, costing U.S $2.85
billion. Nineteen other projects were underway, costing U.S.
$2.75 billion. (Metz, 1990, p. 144)
Iraq's oil production peaked at a level of 3.4 million
barrels per day (bpd) in 1979, with proven crude oil reserves
estimated at 65.0 billion barrels (Hilal, 1987, p. 18). Pre-
Iran-Iraq War refining capacity probably reached 3.5 million
bpd with exports at 3.2 million bpd. At the beginning of the
Iran-Iraq War, Iran damaged two main Iraqi off-shore export
terminals, Mina al Bakr and Khawal Amayah. In 1982, Syria
closed Iraq's pipeline to the Mediterranean. Oil revenue
bottomed at U.S. $6.8 billion in 1986 from a peak of $26.5
billion in 1980 (Metz, 1990, p. 143) . This was a temporary
setback. By 1988, Iraq had built new refineries and new
pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia which boosted
transport capability to approximately 2.75 million bpd and
production to 2.8 million bpd. Oil revenue recovered to U.S.
$11.3 billion (Metz, 1990, pp. 142-143). Forecasts for 1989
and 1990 indicated an export capacity of 2.5 million bpd and
2.8 million bpd, respectively. (Joffe, 1988, p. 20) Iraq
claimed oil reserves of 103 billion barrels in 1988 (Joffe,
1988, p 19) . However, the decline in oil prices resulted in
reduced revenues.
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One of the early pillars in Saddam Hussein's economic
plan was to move away from an oil dependent economy and to use
oil generated revenues (as investment dollars) to diversify
into other growth sectors of the economy (industrial
production, agriculture, transportation, etc.).
Four major events resulted in a prolonged drain on oil
investment dollars. Economic resources were diverted and
production resources were destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War.
Oil prices collapsed on the world oil markets and other
sectors of the economy outside the oil sector required
continued investment. As a result, Saddam had difficulty
achieving his diversification goal and the government entered
into a period of increased deficit spending and foreign
borrowing to simultaneously sustain the war effort and pursue
diversification goals. By 1988, the United States had become
a primary lender to Iraq.
4 . Non-Oil Industries
Iraq's oil wealth led to a growing welfare state
system. At the same time, the state supported capitalization
of public and private enterprises. Early efforts at economic
diversification using oil wealth were successful as industries
expanded from the 1960's through the 1980' s. By 1978, the
Iraqi government completed a reorganization of the public
industrial sector by establishing ten independent state
organizations for major industries including spinning/weaving,
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chemicals and engineering. Under state direction, capital
investments in large scale industrial facilities grew and
plant construction outpaced infrastructure development.
In some cases, the newly manufactured intermediate
materials were under employed because of low demand. Excess
capacity, resulting from lack of a free market system,
strained the economy's ability to absorb the new goods. Iraq
had to import finished goods and other materials because
intermediate products could not be converted to meet market
needs. This again illustrated ineffective government control.
Basically, Iraq defeated the purpose of building these plants.
(Metz, 1990, p. 147) These investments did not lead to
optimization or efficiency in the overall economy. In
summary, productivity relative to investment was low due to
government controls, unused capacity and overstocked
inventories of under utilized resources. Serious
inefficiencies occurred because the Iraqi government
controlled the type of industrial goods being produced instead
of allowing the competitive market to decide the appropriate
mix and quantity of goods and services.
Despite problems, there were still significant gains
in industrial production. Steel production and construction
enjoyed a 17.6 percent growth rate from 1973 to 1980 and
accounted for 6.8 percent of GDP by 1980. (Hilal, 1987, p.
33) During the same period, construction accounted for a 7.6
percent increase in GDP, representing an annual growth rate of
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69.2 percent. (Hilal, 1987, p. 33) Throughout the 1980's,
both public and private expenditures in industry rose.
Legislation exempted the private sector from duties and taxes
on certain goods. Exemptions for capital investment and
research and development also grew. By 1982, the private
sector contributed 93.8 percent of GDP (including the oil
sector) while private sector employment and wages were ahead
of the public sector. (Farouk-Sluglett , 1987, p. 238)
The year 1987 saw the privatization of the State
bureaucracy largely accomplished. Forty State-run factories
had been privatized due to inefficiency and unprofitability of
industry while under governmental control. (Metz, 1990, p.
xxv) Privatization steps by the government reflected a desire
for greater economic efficiency rather than a change in
political or economic ideology. Government controls on the
economy were further reduced by cutting subsidies, allowing
partial foreign ownership and reducing bureaucratic regulation
of enterprises. Labor costs accounted for 20 to 40 percent of
output compared with 10 percent in non-socialist economies.
(Metz, 1990, p. 128) A potential boost to labor productivity
came as a result of Decree 653 of May 1987. The decree
abolished labor laws guaranteeing adults life time employment
and gave individuals the freedom to choose jobs. This was





Agriculture, supplemented by State assistance, was a
growing sector of the economy which employed a large portion
of the labor force. Food was produced primarily for domestic
consumption and included dates, barley, wheat, rice and
vegetables. From 1976 through 1986, Iraq spent $4 billion in
agriculture investments.
By 1977, Iraq gave 7.75 million hectares of land,
previously sequestered from feudal lords, to poor farming
cooperatives. (Farouk-Sluglett , 1987, p. 244) During the
1970' s, initial land reforms were implemented to break up
large estates (government or feudally owned) into small owner-
operator farms. Government still limited the amount of land
individuals could hold and would seize land without
compensating owners. Small farms, lack of capital and
inadequate technical expertise made mechanization and
economies of scale difficult to achieve. Much land lay
fallow. Rural labor flight and subsequent farm labor
shortages occurred in the late 1970' s.
In 1981, Iraq moved away from privatization and
established 28 collective state farms with profit sharing
incentives (Metz, 1990, p. 158) . Urban migration continued,
though, with only 31 percent of the population living in the
countryside. The Iran-Iraq War also forced Iraq to employ
immigrant labor to replace fighting men. Due to this war,
Iraq was compelled to increase the country's self-sufficiency.
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By 1983, the government issued permits to allow local and
foreign Arabs to rent unlimited plots of land (below market
price) for 15 to 20 year periods from the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform. (Farouk-Sluglett , 1987, p. 245) By 1986,
agriculture represented 8 percent of total GDP and 30 percent
of the labor force (Metz, 1990, p. 155) .
Reprivatization was again activated in 1984 and
continued through at least 1987. Many agricultural
collectives returned to the private sector. Nonetheless,
despite major State investments, production and productivity
in agriculture continued to decline. The uncoordinated nature
of investments, bureaucracy in reform implementation and urban




Transportation, communications and storage, all
required to move goods in a growing economy, were considered
poor in 1974. However, the Iraqi government invested heavily
in this category from 1973 to 1980 (45 percent annual increase
and 4.7 percent of GDP). From 1980 to 1984, there was only
7.5 percent growth, probably due to the war. (Hilal, 1987, p.
37)
By the late 1980' s, transportation was one of the most
active sectors of the economy and received a large share of
the domestic development budget. Improvements in this area
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were considered essential to support the Iran-Iraq War effort,
reduce transportation bottlenecks that limited industrial
development, promote regional integration and provide more
central government presence in remote regions.
Airports received much attention in 1987. A new
facility was built in Baghdad and the airfield at Basra was
upgraded. Prior to 1987, the State Enterprise for Iraqi
Airways (SEIA) , run by the government, maintained 35 Ilysuhin
cargo planes and 14 Boeing passenger jets. Privatization
occurred in this year and the Iraqi Aviation Company (formerly
a part of SEIA) began to operate commercially as a national
airline. Stock was sold to the public, with the Iraqi
government maintaining a minority share.
7 . Trade
Throughout the 1970' s, import of plastics and
chemicals doubled and tripled, respectively. Tariffs and
other trade barriers were erected to protect Iraqi infant
industries from foreign competition. This impeded importation
of certain vital materials (spare parts and machinery)
necessary to improve Iraqi production capabilities. (Metz,
1990, pp. 148-148)
In the 1980' s, more than 95 percent of Iraqi exports
consisted of raw materials and food. Iraqi foreign trade was
shaped by the Iran-Iraq War, resulting in deficit and debt
problems. Iranian attacks on petroleum facilities reduced oil
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exports sharply. Highlights from this period include a 1981
trade deficit of U.S. $10 billion. In 1982, the trade deficit
reached U.S. $23 billion. In response to the large trade
deficit, Iraq cut imports in half during 1983. During 1986,
GDP was U.S. $35 billion and oil contributed 33.5 percent to
GDP .
Iraqi exports for 1987 were valued at between U.S.
$7.5 and $12 billion. Crude oil, refined petroleum, natural
gas, chemical fertilizers and dates accounted for the majority
of exports. The apparent drop in exports from previous years
was due to a plunge in oil prices. Even an increase in
production volume was not enough to off-set these lower
prices. (Metz, 1990, p. 168) Iraqi imports totaled $10
billion with capital goods accounting for 34.4 percent, raw
materials 30 percent, food stuffs 22.4 percent and consumer
goods 12.5 percent. (Metz, 1990, p. xvi) There was an
increasing reluctance by trading partners to extend credit.
During 1987, the Ministry of Trade implemented a
national import policy by allocating portions of a total
budget among imports according to priority. The highest
priority was spare parts and management services for
maintenance of large industrial projects. The Ministry wanted
to minimize the possibility of having to close facilities
which would have huge start up costs should they be reopened.
The goal was to gradually replace imported manufactured goods
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with domestically produced goods and then increase export
sales
.
Further, the Iraqi government recognized that
increased domestic production required importing intermediate
goods (previously restricted) and State companies were
permitted to use private agents to facilitate importing
limited private goods. Some deregulation of the private
sector ensued and the government abolished private licensing
for construction material, raw material spare parts and
machinery for plant modernization and expansion.
Additionally, foreign investment was encouraged by
loosening direct investment restrictions. All foreign firms
engaged in development projects were exempt from paying taxes
and duties. Foreign employees did not pay Iraqi taxes.
E. SUMMARY
Basic background information on Iraq and Iraqi economic
policies spanning the period from 1970 through the late 1980'
s
has been presented. Throughout this timeframe, Iraq embarked
on aggressive expansion policies touching every facet of
economic development. While many of Saddam Hussein's economic
programs were touted as free market reforms, in actuality most
policies just changed the nature of governmental controls or
were never fully implemented. Saddam Hussein's economic
reforms could not be achieved without parallel political
reforms. "He thus found himself trapped by the
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incompatibility of his own desire to maintain absolute rule
and the basic requirements of a market economy, " explain
Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett (Farouk-Sluglett
,
1990, p. 23) . Therefore, it is not completely clear whether
Saddam Hussein embarked on a series of financial reforms for
his own aggrandizement or for the welfare of his people.
Initially, while the country enjoyed extremely high
revenues from oil, the government maintained strict planning
and control over policy and implementation and acted as a
vehicle to redistribute wealth. The Iran-Iraq War took a
significant toll on the economy. As a result of the major
economic and social losses, policy makers appear to have
relinquished some authority in an effort to adopt free market
reforms
.
By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi economy was
weak and in need of loans and currency to rebuild
infrastructure and oil production facilities. In order to
rebuild and protect modest gains in agricultural and
industrial development, Saddam Hussein looked to the West for
financial support in the form of loans and western
agricultural and industrial exports.
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III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
This chapter discusses sanctions, definitions, successes
and failures in general terms to assist the reader in
understanding specific actions that were taken on the part of
the United States against Iraq. The chapter also outlines the
rationale used in formulating specific questions that comprise
the basis for analysis which appears in Chapter IV.
A. SANCTIONS OVERVIEW
There are numerous types and diverse definitions of
sanctions. This thesis will focus on finance and trade
related economic sanctions highlighted in Figure 2.
Initially, an overview of the different types of sanctions,
the purpose of sanctions, success, failure and reasons for
using sanctions will be presented.
Sanctions may be defined as rewards or punishment for a
given action. In a legal context, Margaret Doxey describes
sanctions as "negative measures which seek to influence
conduct by threatening and, if necessary, imposing penalties
for non-conformity with the law." (Doxey, 1972, p. 528) Johan
Galtung provides the most comprehensive generic definition of
sanctions "as actions initiated by one or more international
actors ... against one or more others... by depriving them of
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some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain
norms the senders deem important." (Galtung, 1967, p. 379)
United States policy makers have a variety of sanction
tools at their disposal to change another country's behavior.
For example, in foreign policy endeavors, diplomatic,
communication, military and economic options can be used
individually or in combination to pressure or influence
others. Diplomatic sanctions may include non-recognition,
expulsion of diplomats from the host country or complete
severing of diplomatic relations. Communication sanctions may
take the form of loss of mail contact or cessation of general
telecommunications and transportation links. (Galtung, 1968,
p. 383) Military sanctions run the gamut from a threat to use
force, to a regional show of force, to a full scale invasion.
In the case of Iraq, all of these measures were used in
varying degrees to express the United States' displeasure










Figure 2: Economic Sanctions
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B. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Having discussed the general definition of sanctions, this
section will explore the various types of economic statecraft
that can be employed against a foreign country. The purpose
is to define the various economic options available to policy
makers, identify those particular sanctions used against Iraq
and develop the criteria for the list of seven sanction
questions to be answered later in order to determine if Saddam
Hussein anticipated sanctions. A complete list of sanctions
actually imposed against Iraq is contained in Appendix B.
Economic statecraft are those economic measures that
leaders can use to influence international actors (Baldwin,
1985, p.l) . Included are "all economic means by which foreign
policy makers might try to influence other international
actors." (Ellings, 1985, p. 40) Economic statecraft has a
broader definition than economic sanctions because it
integrates the disciplines of economics and political science.
Economic statecraft has three component elements: economic
warfare, economic aid and economic sanctions.
1 . Economic Warfare
Economic warfare is usually associated with instances
where countries are engaged in military conflict. Economic
warfare measures may include pre-emptive purchases, global
embargoes, coercing neutrals to cooperate, blockades and
bombing factors of production behind enemy lines." (Hufbauer,
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1985, p. 6) Both Yuan-li Wu and Robert Schelling have
slightly broader definitions in that military hostilities are
not necessarily part of the equation. Yuan-li Wu perceives
economic warfare in terms of international measures that
enhance the strength (war making potential) of a country
relative to an actual or potential enemy. Schelling defines
it in terms of the economic means by which damage is imposed
on other countries or the threat of damage used to bring
pressure on them. (Baldwin, 1985, pp. 36-38) Yet most other
definitions of economic warfare are closely tied to military
actions. Economic warfare, Richard Ellings states,
"...includes military attacks against an enemy's industrial
installations, blockades, and strictly economic actions such
as embargoes." (Ellings, 1991, p. 154) Margaret Doxey adds,
"In conditions of war, the target is the enemy; the objective
is to hasten defeat, to reduce or eliminate its capacity to
wage war and to undermine morale." (Doxey, 1980, p. 9)
In the case of Iraq, on August 11, 1991, the United
States initiated economic warfare by enforcing a naval
blockade and embargo against Iraq. Shortly thereafter, the
United States embraced UN Sanction 661 which, in part, banned
sales and supplies of arms to Iraq. Australian, British,
French and U.S. naval units interdicted petroleum and other
shipments out of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and Turkey stopped oil
exports via pipelines through their countries. (Eilts, 1991,
p. 10)
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2. Economic Aid/Positive Sanctions
While most connotations of sanctions have a negative
implication, economic aid is considered a positive sanction.
Economic aid can be used as an incentive to gain foreign
policy goals. (Doxey, 1972, p. 2) Providing a country with
economic aid indicates a positive or supportive orientation
toward the recipient even though it may not imply approval of
specific policies or actions (Ellings, 1985, p. 102) .
Historical uses of positive sanctions include the Marshall
Plan, U.S. private investment in the Commonwealth of
Independent States to support emerging capitalist interests
and development aid to Less Developed Countries such as Iraq.
Table 3 lists the types of positive sanctions (Ellings, 1985,
p. 42) .
Table 3: POSITIVE SANCTIONS
TRADE CAPITAL
- Tariff discrimination (favorable) - Providing aid
- Granting most favored nation - Investment guarantees
- Tariff reduction - Encouragement of
- Direct Purchase private capital
- Subsidies to exports or imports exports/imports
- Granting licenses (import/export) - Taxation (favorable)
- Promises of above - Promises of above
Prior to the Persian Gulf War, the United States made
extensive use of positive sanctions in an attempt to influence
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Saddam Hussein's policies. President Bush defined U.S. policy
toward Iraq in October 1989 when he signed National Security
Directive 26. This Directive proposed economic and political
incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase
U.S. influence with Iraq. Undersecretary of State Robert
Kimmett declared, "Iraq was very important to U.S. interests
in the Middle East. . .and was a key to maintaining stability in
the region, offering great trade opportunities for U.S.
companies." (Barber, 1991, p. 2) These supportive policies
provided some assistance to rebuilding the beleaguered Iraqi
economy
.
It appears that extensive agricultural loans,
guaranteed under the U.S Department of Agriculture's Export
Credit Guarantee Programs were the cornerstone of U.S. policy.
Loans were supposed to be used for agricultural products and
related goods only; however, there is some indication that
loans were also used for other types of goods including
military armament. Under the auspices of the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) , U.S. exporters and any financial
institution operating in the United States (including Banco
Livorno Nationale (BNL) , an Italian bank with a branch in
Atlanta, Georgia) were guaranteed repayment for credit sales
made to Iraq. At the time of the invasion, CCC had a $2
billion liability under loans guaranteed for Iraq.
Increasingly larger export credit guarantees were
approved for Iraq from 1983 through 1989 and eventually
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totalled $4.5 billion. An additional $500 million was
approved for 1990 despite Iraq's uncreditworthiness and BNL'
s
alleged bank fraud of over $750 million unauthorized,
unreported CCC guaranteed loans to Iraq. Loans were intended
to be used for Iraqi purchase of agricultural producted and
related goods.
Iraq also benefitted from other agricultural export
programs totaling over $511.7 million from 1986 to 1990.
(GAO-NSIAD-91-76, 1990, p. 2) Even after the BNL
improprieties were exposed, a January 1990 order allowing the
Export-Import Bank (Exim-bank) to offer fresh guarantees for
Iraqi loans was approved. (Barber, 1991, p. 2) In 1988, U.S.
companies sought to secure Exim-bank financing for Iraqi
projects totaling $13 billion (U.S. Congress, 1991, p. H2552) .
Just prior to the invasion, the United States was
still considering Iraq's request for another $500 million in
loan guarantees despite the fact that Iraq was in arrears on
payments. These loan programs ceased after the invasion. In
fact, continuation of aid to Iraq until just prior to the Gulf
War may have sent mixed signals regarding U.S. intentions and
reactions to the invasion of Kuwait.
3. Negative Types of Economic Sanctions
"Economic sanctions are economic measures directed
toward political ob jectives . . . and are employed in an attempt
to achieve political ends by economic means," according to
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Johan Galtung (Galtung, 1967, pp. 367-383). Richard Ellings
defines economic sanctions as "governmental policies involving
the cut-off of economic exchange by one or more nations for
the purposes of coercing the target (s) according to norms of
the sanctioners with (usually) immediate goals." (Ellings,
1985, p. 8) Hufbauer and Schott state that economic sanctions
are "the deliberate government-inspired withdrawal, or threat
of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations."
(Hufbauer, 1985, p. 2) While foreign aid techniques achieve
more public attention, negative sanctions are principally
employed by U.S. policy makers. There are two categories of
negative sanctions: trade and capital/financial. Some of the
techniques of each type will be described below. Trade and




Trade sanctions can be defined as measures in which
one country publicly suspends a major portion of its trade
with another country to obtain political objectives (Baldwin,
1985, p. 154) . Trade sanctions are highly visible, often
legislated. Both sender and target countries stand to lose
when sanctions are applied (Olson, 1979. p. 477) . Trade
sanctions include a variety of actions: embargo, boycott,
tariff increase, unfavorable tariff discrimination, withdrawal
of most favored nation treatment, blacklist, quota, license
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denial, dumping, preclusive purchasing, export/import
restrictions or threats of the above (Galtung, 1967, p. 383)
(Ellings, 1985, p. 41) (Hufbauer, 1985, p. 28) (Wallensteen,
1968, p. 248) (Doxey, 1980, p. 92) (Baldwin, 1985, p. xii) .
There are varying degrees of application ranging
from total disengagement to slight declines. Richard Olson
advocates non-public subtle techniques such as delays in
delivery of spare parts or snags in licensing/technical
transfers. Subtle measures can "...create serious economic
distress .. .while not providing much in the way of a
nationalism-generating scapegoat." (Olson, 1979, p. 485)
U.S. trade sanctions against Iraq were neither
gradual nor subtle. Boycotts, embargoes and import-export
restrictions were strict and severe. On 2 August 1990, the
Administration initiated a comprehensive trade embargo against
Iraq. A 9 August Executive Order further prohibited export
and import of goods, technology and services between the
United States and Iraq. In addition, no U.S. person would be
permitted to deal in Iraqi goods; there would be no
transportation to and from Iraq and all Iraqi property held by
the United States or U.S. citizens would be blocked. (U.S.
Congress, 21 Feb 1991, pp. 36-37) According to John C. Kelly,
Jr., Director of Strategic Investigations Division, U.S.
Customs Service, from August 1990 through February 1991,
"Customs made more than 70 seizures of goods destined for
Iraq.
. .valued at nearly $10 million." (U.S. Congress, 21 Feb
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1991, p. 4) Additionally, the Department of State revoked all
licenses and approvals authorizing the export or transfer of
defense items to Iraq (CRS, 10 Aug 1992, p. 598).
b. Capital Sanctions
Capital sanctions usually involve the suspension,
curtailment, manipulation or freezing of a target country's
financial and/or commercial assets. Target countries are
often hurt through a reduction of commercial and official
finance (Hufbauer, 1985, p. 28) . This may require the target
country to pay a higher interest rate to alternative
creditors. Due to Iraq's poor credit rating and successful
international compliance with sanctions, it is doubtful that
any government officially will loan money to Iraq.
Although financial sanctions are not new, Ellings
suggests that technological advances have made some of these
measures easier to implement. He said, "Foreign bank
deposits are susceptible to 'freezes,' and export-control
bureaucracies have grown much more sophisticated." (Ellings,
1985, p. 26) As will be shown later, however, ease of
implementation does not translate into ease of transaction
tracking
.
Freezing includes impounding assets and denying
access to bank accounts or other financial assets owned by the
target country. Controls on import or export of capital
involve restrictions on who can transfer how much capital for
what purposes into or out of a country. The U.S. sanctions
against Iraq prohibited the commitment or transfer of funds or
other financial or economic resources by any U.S. person to
the Government of Iraq or Iraqi citizens. Blocking financial
transactions is accomplished through the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, which in turn issues direction to other Federal
Reserve member banks
.
Aid suspension is another type of financial
sanction and is the reduction, termination, or slowdown of aid
transfers. Section 513 of the fiscal year 1982 Foreign
Assistance Appropriation Act first prohibited direct
assistance funds to Iraq. This Act was strengthened in 1991
with a similar piece of legislation which, from a financial
standpoint, ceased: all U.S. support for assistance from
international financial institution; Exim-bank guarantees and
credits; any assistance or credit from the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) ; and all assistance under the Arms Export
Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, other than
emergency and humanitarian relief. (CRS, 10 Aug 1992, pp.
593-599)
There are several other types of financial
sanctions that may be used by a country but were not employed
by the United States against Iraq. Expropriation, or seizing
ownership of property belonging to a target State, is one
technique. A country may also tax assets of a target or
withhold dues and payments to international organizations.
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C. PURPOSE OF SANCTIONS
There are three major reasons why a country may impose
sanctions on another country. Richard Ellings describes these
as Security/Order, Justice and Economic Issues (Ellings, 1985,
p. 8) . Additionally, there are moral and symbolic reasons to
impose sanctions.
Security/Order objectives are the most prevalent reasons
for a country to use sanctions. This type of sanction usually
occurs when an entity is threatened by the actions of another
country or to show displeasure with aggressive behavior.
Ellings noted a total of 72 economic sanction cases world-wide
from 1945 to 1982 that were precipitated by security concerns
(Ellings, 1985, p. 128) . Punishing or deterring foreign
military adventures, changing or de-stabilizing an unfriendly
government, limiting proliferation of nuclear weapons, curbing
international terrorism and damaging or threatening the wealth
and economic capability of a country are primary motivators
for a government to impose security/order sanctions. Displays
of economic power, deterrence against future misdeeds and
substitutes for stronger actions are other reasons a country
may choose to impose security/order sanctions.
Justice is the second major reason for using sanctions.
Ellings lists a total of 18 instances of sanctions world-wide
in this category (Ellings, 1985, p. 128). Human rights
violations are a primary cause for imposing justice sanctions.
These sanctions are usually levied to show moral outrage or
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disapproval with a country's actions or to pressure a country
to improve its human rights posture.
Economic issues, the last category, usually involve
disputes over fishing, ocean or property rights. These are
the least likely reasons for a country to impose sanctions
with only 15 cases recorded from 1945 to 1982 (Ellings, 1985,
p. 128) .
The United States imposed sanctions against Iraq in
August 1990 for both security and justice reasons. President
Bush stated four objectives for his reaction to the invasion
of Kuwait. His goals were to force the Iraqis unconditionally
out of Kuwait, to restore the legitimate government of the
Emirate, to protect American citizens and to preserve/enhance
the security of the Persian Gulf (U.S. Congress, Dec 1990, p.
310) . In a 16 August 1990 Washington Post article, President
Bush was much more to the point
:
Our action in the Gulf is not about religion, greed or
cultural differences . . . Our jobs, our way of life, our own
freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the
world would all suffer if control of the world's greatest
oil reserves fell into the hand of that one man - Saddam
Hussein (Coll, 1990, p. A31)
.
Additionally, the United States was interested in deterring
future aggressive actions by Iraq against Saudi Arabia.
Certainly the United States was morally outraged with Iraqi
aggression toward Kuwait and with the more dismal prospect of
having Hussein control a majority of the Middle East's oil
production. According to a Congressional Research Service
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Report, other goals and reasons for sanctions against Iraq
were to cripple Iraq' s military capabilities and willingness
to intimidate neighbors, to set an example for the post-Cold
War new world order and, specifically, to oust Saddam Hussein.
There are additional reasons to impose sanctions. "Even
if the imposition of economic sanctions achieves no
substantial results, they are said to symbolize our distaste
for specific heinous actions of terrorists and our anathema
toward human rights violators," explain Henry Bienen and
Robert Gilpin (Bienen, 1980, p. 89) . Margaret Doxey expresses
a similar view, "Effectiveness must be judged on a case by
case basis, and although authorized sanctions may have more
symbolic value, the absence of authorization for collective
measures does not necessarily rob them of efficacy." (Doxey,
1987, p. 531) Even if the United States did not think
sanctions would have been totally effective against Iraq, U.S.
policy makers probably would have used them anyway to show
moral outrage with Iraq's unacceptable international behavior.
To date, however, it appears that Saddam Hussein is not
affected by world or internal public opinion. Despite
international outcry, he continued to bomb Kurdish rebels
until the U.N. established a no-fly zone in northern Iraq.
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D. SANCTIONS: SUCCESS, EFFECTIVENESS AND FAILURE
1. Definition of Success
A wide variety of opinion exists on what constitutes
a successful sanction. For example, Margaret Doxey describes
an effective sanction as "one which succeeds in producing the
desired behavioral response from the individual or group to
which it is communicated." (Doxey, 1980, p. 529) Using
Doxey' s definition, economic sanctions against Iraq would not
be considered successful because Saddam Hussein did not
retreat from Kuwait until after military force was applied.
Even if sanctions had been given more time to work, it is
doubtful that Saddam Hussein would have complied. Even in
1992, with many sanctions still in place, he still presented
opposition to terms of the peace settlement and UN
resolutions. Lack of Iraqi cooperation during inspections of
nuclear facilities is another example of policy failure.
Richard Ellings ties success or failure to the
"capacity to inflict economic deprivation." (Ellings, 1985,
p. 7) In Congressional testimony, CIA Director William Webster
stated, "Sanctions have all but shut off Iraq's exports (97
percent) and reduced imports to less than ten percent of their
pre-invasion level." (U.S. Congress, Dec 1990, p. 113) Using
Ellings' definition, sanctions would be considered successful .
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Other gauges have been used to measure the success of
economic sanctions. Most notably, an extensive history and
analysis of 116 cases of economic sanctions is presented by
Gary Hufbauer, Jeffery Schott and Kimberly Elliot (Hufbauer,
1990, p. 32) . The authors judge the effects of sanctions
using a standard set of criteria and then draw policy
conclusions using historical information to determine if
sanctions have worked.
...Success of an economic sanction has two parts: the
extent to which the policy outcome sought by the sender
country was in fact achieved, and the contribution made by
the sanctions (as opposed to other factors, such as
military action) to a positive outcome (Hufbauer, 1990, p.
41) .
Their model also assesses political and economic variables in
order to determine if a sanction is successful. In the case
of Iraq, an overall assessment was not made because the
outcome of the case was still unclear as the book went to
press in 1990. However, the authors stated that they were
"relatively optimistic that sanctions would contribute to a
positive outcome - the withdrawal of Iraq troops from Kuwait,
the release of all hostages, and the restoration of a
credible, independent government in Kuwait - but not the
complete defeat of Saddam Hussein." (Hufbauer, 1990, p. 298)
2. Effectiveness of Sanctions
Two themes emerge from a survey of the literature
consulted. First, economic sanctions are ineffective, are
often counter-productive and are becoming an increasingly
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useless tool. Hufbauer concluded that although economic
sanctions are being used more frequently, they are meeting
with less and less success. For example, their analysis
determined that between 1914 and 1973 sanctions were effective
36 percent of the time while from 1973 through 1984, sanctions
were effective only 28 percent of the time (Hufbauer, 1985, p.
80) .
Other writers express similar views. According to
Peter Wallensteen, "Major powers have never been able to deter
military adventures of other major powers simply through the
use of economic sanctions." (Wallensteen, 1968, p. 5)
Margaret Doxey and Judith Miller concur with this view and
note that, "...there is little evidence that economic
sanctions provide reliable means of inducing states to adhere
to an internationally accepted code of conduct and are often
an ineffective means to achieve foreign policy objectives."
(Doxey, 1972, p. 125) (Miller, 1980, p. 118) James Barber
also espouses this view and explained that while trade
boycotts, embargoes, and other economic sanctions are
legitimate alternatives to military action, they rarely work
(Barber, 1979, p. 373) .
This perspective is probably true in the case of Iraq
because until military force was applied, Iraqi forces did not
retreat from Kuwait. Wallensteen also noted, "Target
countries are seldom cut off from alternative markets or
financing sources when sanctions are imposed; trade and
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finance channels usually remain open, even through at higher
cost." (Wallensteen, 1968, p. 5) Bruce Bartlett concurs with
this view and explained that trade sanctions, especially when
unilaterally imposed, just alter trade patterns rather than
inflict serious damage (U.S. Congress, 11 March 1986, p. 1).
While it is generally valid that countries find other
sources for trade and finance, due to the multinational broad-
based support for sanctions, this was not the case with Iraq.
Saddam Hussein was virtually cut off from all markets and, at
least during the period of the Gulf War, had little access to
the outside world except through Jordan. Jordanian ties to
Iraq are understandable since no less than 160 Jordanian firms
had strong commercial and industrial connections to Iraq and
by 1990 about three-fourths of Jordan's industry was working
primarily for export to Iraq. Saddam Hussein also gave large
sums of money to influential Jordanian institutions and
personalities to cultivate their support (Baram, 1991, p. 58) .
The second theme that emerges from the literature is
that sanctions do have limited political usefulness in a
defined set of circumstances. Success hinges on a wide
variety of issues including the relationship between sender
and target, whether the sanction is imposed multilaterally or
unilaterally, the size and relative power of the sender and




David Baldwin states that the utility of economic
techniques of statecraft are underestimated because of the
inadequate analytic framework used to make estimates. There
are non-economic measures of success including "...shame,
isolation from the world community and as a signal to use more
radical measures that cause a target country to reexamine
policies." Baldwin points out that failures in traditional
cost/benefit analysis occur because not all benefits are
observable. (Baldwin, 1985, p. 53)
James Barber also is concerned with the framework of
the analysis and notes that it is difficult to evaluate the
effectiveness of sanctions because "...their application
cannot be isolated from other factors. Circumstances and
objectives change over time, and there is always a diversity
of objectives against which success or failure may be
measured." He suggests in the cases of Yugoslavia, Uganda and
Cuba, "...although sanctions may not achieve their primary
goal, sometimes they do have an economic effect on the target
country .. .Even the threat of sanctions to economic interests
cannot be taken lightly." (Barber, 1979, p. 367) There is
little doubt that sanctions continue to have a negative impact
on the economy of Iraq; however, the extent and length of time
it will take for sanctions to have the desired impact is still
unknown
.
Of those sanctions that are considered useful, certain
types may be considered more successful than others. For
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example, according to Hufbauer, " . . .financial sanctions can be
more effective than trade sanctions because there is not
backlash from business at home, long term relations are
unsettled when financial sanctions are imposed and denial of
finance may disrupt plans of a government." (Hufbauer, 1985,
p. 59.) Hufbauer stated in congressional testimony that
nothing gets a government's attention more quickly than being
denied finance (U.S. Congress, 11 Mar 1986, p. 71) . Given the
perceived effectiveness of financial sanctions and in order to
determine if Saddam Hussein anticipated financial sanctions
prior to invading Kuwait, Iraq's financial transactions in the
United States will be analyzed in a subsequent chapter.
An important point made by Richard Ellings is that
economic sanctions could have a counter-productive effect on
the target country by stiffening resistance in the target
county. (Ellings, 1985, p. 138) This was most evident in the
1960's sanctions against Rhodesia. Due to the strong hold
Saddam Hussein has on the Iraqi people, they probably are not
showing resolve against sanctions but are displaying
resignation in accepting a deprived and austere lifestyle.
Saddam Hussein has made a career of manipulating and
consolidating the loyalty of his countrymen through propaganda
and, when necessary, through force. The Iraqi people have
already shown during the Iran-Iraq War the ability to make
great sacrifices. It appears that while the masses are
suffering, Saddam Hussein is attempting to preserve a modicum
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of comfort for his extensive family, the elite and the
military
.
3 . Reasons Sanctions Fail
Sanctions fail for a variety of reasons. Deterrence
in any form would not have worked against Iraq, explained
Janice Gross Stein. She stated that Saddam Hussein believed
the United States was trying to destabilize the Iraqi regime
since at least April 1990 and probably as early as 1989 when
credit loans to Iraq were curtailed. (Stein, 1992, p. 166)
Saddam Hussein's actions were aimed at protecting himself from
what he perceived to be a definitive threat from the United
States to oust him.
Galtung emphasizes the difficulty of compliance and
the degree to which the target is vulnerable. Some countries
will not participate in enforcing the sanctions. Target
countries may find ways of circumventing sanctions such as
smuggling and use of third parties. The target country may
choose to run on internal resources. (Galtung, 1967, p. 411)
Critics charge that lax enforcement has permitted some
smuggling into Iraq across Jordanian, Turkish and Iranian
borders. "With the help of smuggled goods and equipment, the
Iraqi elite continue to live comfortably and Saddam is able to
project an image of rebuilding Iraq back to a state of
normalcy despite the embargo, " reported a Congressional
Research Service document (CRS, 17 Apr 1992, p. 19) .
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Imposition of sanctions may create a wartime spirit of
resistance in the target state as the target attempts to
stockpile goods, find alternative markets, diversify the
domestic economy, and divert the economic impact away from
politically strong groups (Barber, 1979, p. 376) . Even if
sanctions are effective, moral outrage of citizens in sending
or neutral countries may result in political pressure causing
the sender to revoke or modify sanctions. According to
information in the Congressional Record, there has been some
discussion, albeit minor, regarding the negative impact of the
sanctions against Iraq on U.S. businesses (specifically loss
of revenue for agriculture and defense industries)
.
Additionally, some sanctions have been modified to permit
humanitarian aid.
Richard Ellings blames incidents of failed sanctions
on a global loss of power experienced by dominant states,
"Sanctions are a sign of growing weakness and are a response
by the world power to retain leadership in an environment of
increasing disorder." Over time, a powerful country such as
the United States becomes increasingly weaker until its
sanction policies have minimal impact on world affairs.
(Ellings, 1985, p. 41) Although this is an interesting
theory, it does not appear to hold true in the U.S. -Iraq
instance. The United States showed strong military and
political leadership as the keystone of the coalition against
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Iraq and in light of the new world order, is the undisputed
international military power.
Hufbauer lists several other reasons for sanction
failure including: the means are not adequate for the task,
sanctions themselves may create their own antidote, the target
country allies may support their cause, or there may be a
backlash at home or abroad creating an unwelcome atmosphere
for sanctions.
4 . Why Sanctions Are Used
The majority of references consulted revealed a
general consensus that economic sanctions are unsuccessful.
Why, then, do they continue to be employed? According to
James Lindsay, "Sanctions .. .have a great deal of appeal as
international and domestic symbols." (Lindsay, 1986 p. 153)
Sanctions are also viewed as a way to communicate displeasure
without the costs of using military force. "Political leaders
use them to signal resolve and demonstrate leadership or to
divert attention from domestic issues. They communicate to
transgressing regimes and their own population outrage,
firmness or solidarity," stated Ellings (Ellings, 1991, p.l).
Congressman Tony Roth, in a Hearing before the Sub-committee
on International Economic Policy and Trade, supported this
view. He noted that the frequency in the use of trade
sanctions as an instrument of national policy coincides with
a national desire to limit or avoid the use of military
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options in conflicts around the world and to find appropriate
and justified responses (U.S. Congress, 11 Mar 1986, p. 3) .
Finally, Baldwin points out that while it is difficult to
measure the effects and utility of economic sanctions, other
diplomatic efforts are equally as difficult to quantify
(Baldwin, 1985, pp. 138-144). Therefore, sanctions appear to
be no better or worse than other non-military policy options.
In summary, it appears that sanctions have been very
effective in cutting off trade and finances to Iraq.
According to CIA Director William Webster, "Baghdad's foreign
exchange reserves are extremely tight, leaving little cash
left to entice sanction busters." He added that many
industries have been shut down and the U.N. imposed embargo
deprives Iraq of approximately $1.5 billion in foreign
exchange monthly. (U.S. Congress, Dec 1990, p. 113)
Unfortunately, sanctions against Iraq have not been
particularly effective as a political tool to achieve U.S.
policy goals. "The only way sanctions will work is if that
converts in his (Hussein's) mind to the destruction of his
reputation and political power, and that will be a long time
in coming," stated psychologist, Dr. Jerrold M. Post, in
Congressional testimony. (U.S. Congress, Dec 1990 p. 76) To
date, the Iraqi leader remains strong in his pan-Arabic and
anti-Western rhetoric and appears to be motivated only by the
use of military force. Iraq still refuses to accept the
conditions prescribed in U.N.
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resolutions for sale of oil to buy food. Saddam Hussein has
also militarily suppressed revolts by Kurds and Shiites.
(CRS, 10 Aug 1992, p. 593)
E. TYPES OF SANCTIONS AND TARGET COUNTRY RESPONSES
After discussing the variety of sanctions a country has at
its disposal and the relative usefulness of financial
sanctions, four major areas dealing with financial and
commercial transactions will comprise the basis for further
analysis: suspending trade, freezing capital assets,
suspending credit and loans and expropriating business and
property
.
1 . Suspending Trade
Suspending trade, including embargoes and boycotts on
all imports and exports, is one action the United States could
have taken against Iraq. If Iraq anticipated U.S. suspension
of trade, it could have curtailed vital exports (oil) to the
United States. However, Iraq only supplied a small amount of
oil to the United States and was in a cash poor position;
thus, Iraq's response would likely increase the sale of oil to
raise needed funds for a war effort. One might also expect
Iraq to increase imports in order to stockpile needed
foodstuffs, war making materiel and weapons prior to the
invasion of Kuwait.
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2. Freezing Capital Assets
Capital asset sanctions, (suspension, curtailment,
manipulation or freezing a target country's financial and/or
commercial assets (gold, currency, stocks, bonds, mutual
funds)), are other measures the U.S could have taken against
Saddam Hussein. If Iraq anticipated sanctions, it is possible
that government officials or private individuals could have
transferred financial holdings in the United States to banking
institutions in the Middle East or other countries less likely
to impose sanctions. Likewise, selling U.S. owned stocks and
bonds or transferring ownership to third parties would also
protect assets.
3 . Suspending Credit and Loans
In anticipation of suspension of commercial credit,
Iraq could have attempted to expedite loans and other
commercial credit offers prior to invading Kuwait in order to
raise additional capital. Iraq also may have stopped payment
on its loans to foreign countries.
4 . Expropriating Businesses and Property
The United States could also have expropriated or
seized Iraqi owned property located in the United States
(including businesses and real estate) . With enough warning,




This chapter began with a broad definition of sanctions,
describing increasingly narrower meanings of economic
sanctions. It also showed how sanctions were used against
Iraq. Sanctions were generically described as actions taken
by sender countries against receiver/target countries to
deprive them of some value and/or to make targets comply with
certain norms. Economic statecraft, which consists of
economic warfare, positive economic aid and negative economic
sanctions, considers sanctions within a geopolitical context.
Subsequent chapters will specifically concentrate on negative
financial and trade sanctions.
In addition to explaining different sanctions, the various
purposes of sanctions were outlined and categorized into three
major areas: Security/Order, Justice and Economic Issues.
Criteria for success was also explained. The difficulty in
defining what constitutes a successful sanction was described.
A general overview of sanction effectiveness revealed that
most scholars do not view economic sanctions as a valuable
tool in gaining target country compliance with the sender's
views. Some scholars believe sanctions are somewhat effective
under certain limited circumstances, with financial sanctions
being the most useful. In the case of Iraq, sanctions may be
considered financially effective since most trade and money
flows have been curtailed. However, from a political
perspective, sanctions have not been worthwhile because Saddam
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Hussein has failed to comply with most U.N. resolutions and
military action was required to oust him from Kuwait. Stein
suggests that Saddam Hussein probably could not have been
deterred from invading Kuwait regardless of U.S. policy.
Finally, four major areas of concentration were presented that
will form the basis for analyzing data presented in Chapter
IV.
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IV. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
A. BACKGROUND
Having discussed economic sanctions U.S. policy makers
could use against Iraq, this chapter analyzes financial
transactions between Iraq and the United States between August
1989 and August 1990. Selected financial flows and trade
statistics will be reviewed to determine if Saddam Hussein
anticipated economic sanctions against his country (i.e., did
Iraq take precautionary measures to protect their assets in
the United States) . Data collection methodology, data
collection limitations, information accuracy limitations and
other factors influencing Saddam Hussein are discussed first.
B. DATA COLLECTION: METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS
Data for this thesis were obtained from various U.S.
government and banking agencies responsible for tracking
financial, trade and banking facts. This information was
augmented by press reporting and statements from Congressional
hearings. Data were gathered by submitting a questionnaire
and requests for information to the U.S. Federal Reserve
System Washington, D.C., the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, the U.S. Treasury Department, the U.S. Commerce
Department and the Security and Exchange Commission.
Appendix A contains the responses received to specific
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questionnaires. As a general rule, information obtained from
government organizations was incomplete. Data were not
collected in a manner that would be useful in determining if
a country anticipated sanctions. It was also reported too
late for indications and warning purposes. Appendix C
discusses general data collection and information shortfalls
in greater detail.
1 . The Federal Reserve
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
provided the "Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council Statistic Release Country Exposure Lending Survey."
This document displays, by country, the amount of money that
foreign borrowers owe U.S. banks. Information is presented on
a quarterly basis and also shows the type of borrower and
maturity distribution of loans.
The Federal Reserve Banks provided some statistical
information but did not complete the questionnaire because
they are not a government agency and are not bound by the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) . The Federal Reserve Bank
of New York stated, "The request encompasses confidential
account information exempt from disclosure based on 5 U.S.C.A
ss 552(b) (4) ." The Federal Reserve also possesses commercial
or financial information obtained from banks, staff opinions,
and analysis that is not available by law except to a party or
an agency in litigation with the Federal Reserve.
Of note, during Congressional testimony, Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, refused to
provide specific information relating to Iraqi banking
transactions in the United States. This information was
requested in direct questions posed by Congressman Henry
Gonzalez, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs Committee. Greenspan again cited
banking laws which prohibited release of banking and
transaction information.
2. The U.S. Treasury Department
The U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Asset
Control (OFAC) ) completed the questionnaire indicating it had
information regarding the sale of Iraqi oil, Iraqi government
bank accounts in the United States and Iraqi government stock
and bond holdings in the United States. However, OFAC listed
all data as proprietary (confidential business records) and
was unable to provide specific data for this study. OFAC does
not routinely maintain the information outlined above unless
a country is under U.S. imposed sanctions. In this case, OFAC
leads U.S. government policy and enforcement efforts after
embargoes are in place. The questionnaire was also submitted
to the Treasury Department's public information office which
declined to complete the questionnaire.
59
3. The U.S. Department of Commerce
The U.S. Department of Commerce (International Trade
Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the
Census) provided the most useful statistics on international
trade, including information related to the sale of Iraq oil,
Iraqi commodity transactions in the United States, Iraqi
commercial real estate holdings and Iraqi private business
stock holdings and transactions.
4. The Security and Exchange Commission
The Security and Exchange Commission did not provide
a response to the questionnaire. No additional governmental
sources of information could be identified that would provide
information on Iraqi stock and bond transactions.
C. LIMITATIONS ON INFORMATION ACCURACY AND AVAILABILITY
In addition to data collection limitations noted above,
there are five other significant factors that reduce the
accuracy and availability of information about Iraqi finances,
trade and economics. These include Iraqi State secrets, Iraqi
front companies, illegal shipments and transshipment, Iraqi
secret financial networks and non-adherence to bank reporting
procedures
.
1. Iraqi State Secrets
Iraq classifies most of its economic information as
state secrets and does not publish standard trade and economic
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data. Thus, the most current information on the Iraqi economy
is based on projections and extrapolations.
2. Iraqi Front Companies
Iraq allegedly has extensive front company networks
operating world-wide. This reduces the accuracy of several
key pieces of information concerning bank holdings, the number
of Iraqi owned businesses in the United States, the value of
Iraqi commodity transactions and the amount of outstanding
loans owed to U.S. banks. The Treasury Department openly
identified 52 businesses and 37 individuals as Iraqi Specially
Designated Nationals (SDNs) only after sanctions were in
place. SDNs are foreign government representatives,
intermediaries or front companies located abroad and
functioning as extensions of their government. SDNs may be
overt or covert. (U.S. Treasury Department, 1 May 1991)
Alleged Iraqi front companies, like Matrix-Churchill 1 and
Associated Instrument Distributors 2 are known to have received
guaranteed bank loans from BNL to procure dual-use technology
items that supported Iraqi military build-ups (Boyd, 1983)
(Allen Friedman, 1990, p. 1.) (U.S. Congress, 21 Feb 1991 p.
7) In a statement before the House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce,
Consumer Protection and Competitiveness, Chairwoman Cardiss
'A Solon, Ohio-based subsidiary of TMG Engineering Group
2Based in Atlanta, GA.
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Collins remarked, "Here in the United States, Iraq has bought
companies, stolen parts and components for nuclear weapons and
even now [February 1991] continues to place orders for needed
supplies." (U.S. Congress, 21 Feb 1991, pp. 4-8)
3. Illegal Shipments and Transshipments
Another data accuracy problem is that some U.S.
companies illegally attempted to ship goods to Iraq without
legal export licenses. Items that U.S. companies
unsuccessfully attempted to ship to Iraq include foodstuffs,
water purification equipment, gas masks, chemical warfare
precursors, missiles and radar technology. Compounding the
illegal export problem are instances where U.S. products are
legally shipped to allies who then transship the goods to
Iraq. These types of transactions also reduce the amount and
accuracy of data available for analysis.
4. Iraqi Secret Financial Networks
Closely tied to front companies are Iraqi secret
financial networks. Accounts that are hidden or disguised
under false names reduce the accuracy of Iraqi account
balances. British and U.S. authorities believe that wealthy
Iraqi exiles, including Saddam Hussein's half brother and
Saddam Hussein's former jeweler, were part of a secret
financial network that may have invested billions of dollars
outside of Iraq for Saddam Hussein's regime and family
(Ignatius, 1992, p. 1). In a 24 February 1992 speech in
62
Kuwait, R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Treasury's Office
of Foreign Asset Control, warned that Iraqi agents want to use
hidden assets to carry out Iraq's financial activities and
rebuild its arms and technology infrastructure (Ignatius,
1992, p. 1)
.
5 . Non-adherence to Bank Reporting Procedures
Also clouding the Iraqi financial picture are domestic
and foreign owned banks operating in the United States that do
not adhere to Federal Reserve Banking procedures . These
procedures require banks to report transactions over $10,000
to the Federal Reserve. Inaccurate reporting underestimates
bank loans and account balances. For example, Banco Nationale
del Lavoro (BNL) , an Atlanta-based branch of an Italian-owned
bank, concealed Iraqi financial transactions with a
sophisticated money-laundering process using chains of banks
in the United States and Europe. From 1984 through 1989, BNL
was Iraq's primary source of credit in the United States.
Arthur J. Wade Jr., a Department of Agriculture investigator
who led a federal task force investigating the Atlanta Branch
of BNL, stated that the financial network was so elaborate
that U.S. intelligence agencies monitoring telexes did not
know the extent or the purpose of $2.6 billion in unsecured
loans arranged for the Iraqis before the Gulf War (Fialka,
1992, p. 1) . Perhaps Congressman Gonzalez summed it up best
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with remarks during the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) investigation, September 13, 1991.
There is nobody here that can say Iraq, even at this
moment, that Saddam Hussein doesn't have a few million
dollars around in our country ... Our regulatory agencies
never really had any control over the tremendous amount
[between $800 billion and one trillion dollars total
foreign investment] of international money floating
around. ... Just a small portion of it can be highly
leverageable for such things as anything from armaments
procurement indirectly through other banks and such things
as drug money laundering. (U.S. Congress, 13 Sep 1991, p.
32) (U.S. Congress, 1992, p. H1274)
D. OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING SADDAM HUSSEIN
1. Increased Use of Sanctions by U. S.
In recent years, the United States has significantly
increased its use of economic sanctions, especially in the
Middle East (see Chapter I. A.) . Significant examples of this
include U.S. sanctions introduced against Iran in 1979.
President Carter embargoed oil imports from Iran, prohibited
foreign aid to Iran and froze Iranian deposits in U.S. banks.
Later, in 1986, the United States froze approximately $12
billion worth of Libyan assets. (Hufbauer, 1985, pp. 627-635)
(Lindsay, 1986, p. 159) Closer to Baghdad, the United States
imposed trade sanctions against Iraq from 1980 to 1982 to
encourage Saddam Hussein to terminate support for
international terrorists. Again, in 1988, both the House and
Senate passed bills that cut the $800 million credit line to
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Iraq because it used chemical weapons against the Kurds
(Joffe, 1988, p. 12) .
In view of the United States' propensity to use
sanctions in a punitive or negative way, Saddam Hussein should
have anticipated some type of economic sanctions when he
decided to invade Kuwait.
2. U.S. Policy: Mixed Signals
Despite the United States' proclivity for using
sanctions, there are significant events that may have misled
Saddam Hussein, causing him not to anticipate sanctions. For
example, on the financial front, two policy decisions that
could have confused Saddam Hussein involved the misuse of farm
credit and loan guarantees. The U.S. administration treated
Iraq with leniency, brushing aside evidence that U.S.
companies and Baghdad abused government guaranteed Iraqi farm
credits used to purchase non-farm items. Indeed, by January
1989, President Bush declared it in the national interest to
allow the Exim-bank to guarantee further loans despite
government studies which concluded that Iraq was not credit
worthy. (Barber, 1991, p. 2)
In 1982, the U.S. State Department took the initiative
to remove Iraq's name from its list of terrorist supporting
countries, and in the summer of 1990, expedited delivery of
food and food credits to Iraq. Throughout this time period
(1982-1990), the State Department generally continued to
65
support pro-Iraqi goals. Reflecting on this apparent lenient
policy toward Iraq, former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Jean Kirkpatrick stated, "I have no doubt Hussein was
misled by these actions. He would encounter very little
opposition from the United States so he felt free to move in
on Kuwait." (U.S. Congress, Dec 1990, p. 734)
Undersecretary of State, Robert Kimmitt, explained
this rationale for continued U.S. support for Iraq. He said,
"Iraq was very important to U.S. interests in the Middle
East... and was a key to maintaining stability in the region
while offering great trade opportunities for U.S. companies."
(U.S. Congress, Dec 1990, p. 2) He noted that terminating
guarantees for Iraq was contrary to the president's intentions
and would most likely further damage relations between the two
countries
.
As late as April, May and June 1990, when high-level
interagency meetings were held at the White House, the
administration rejected economic sanctions against Iraq (U.S.
Congress, Dec 1990, p. 2) . One week before the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, U.S. officials were still seeking ways of
persuading Saddam Hussein to play a moderate role. This
culminated in a meeting between the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,
April Glaspie, and Saddam Hussein in which critics say she
failed to warn Iraqi leaders in strong enough terms to stay
out of Kuwait (U.S. Congress, Dec 1990, p. 2).
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3. Front Companies/Financial Networks
It is possible Saddam Hussein believed Iraqi front
companies and surreptitious financial networks were safe from
exposure. This would have enabled him to continue to obtain
some required goods and money. If this were the case, then he
would have had little need to worry about sanctions, and may
not have taken complete action to protect his assets.
E . RESULTS
Based on the four types of financial sanctions outlined in
Chapter III, seven questions were developed to determine if
Saddam Hussein anticipated economic sanctions prior to
invading Kuwait in August 1990. The following questions are
analyzed in detail:
Did Iraq increase oil exports?
Did Iraq increase imports of U.S. commodities?
Did Iraq transfer money out of U.S. banks?
Did Iraq sell U.S. stocks and bonds?
Did Iraq increase requests for U.S. loans?
Did Iraq abruptly cease loan payments?
Did Iraq attempt to sell U.S. business and real estate
holdings?
1. Did Iraq Increase Oil Exports?
The U.S. Department of Commerce issues monthly reports
on the quality and value of U.S. oil imports. These reports
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are summarized in Table 4 and Figure 3 (U.S Dept of Commerce,
FT900, 1989 - 1990) . No distinct pattern emerges for the one
year period treated in this thesis. However, Iraq appeared to
sell more oil to the United States as the price of oil
declined. A significant increase in oil sales occurred
between June 1990 and July 1990 when Iraq sold approximately
11 million more barrels of oil to the United States than in
the previous month. This represents a 61.3 percent increase
in oil sales and the highest change in quantity for the entire
year. If Saddam Hussein anticipated sanctions, the increased
cash obtained from sales would have provided some cushion
against sanctions and enabled him to purchase war-related
goods on the open or black markets. Increased oil sales is
not a definitive indicator of hostilities. For example, the
sudden increase in oil sales could be equated to a cash-poor
country in urgent need of revenue.
Table 4: U.S. IMPORTS OF IRAQI CRUDE PETROLEUM
Date Net Qtv $ Value $/Barrel Otv Diff
Jul 89 13973 232554 16.6431
Aug 89 14662 225709 15.39415 689
Sep 89 12739 202980 15.93375 -1923
Oct 89 12296 204497 16.63118 -443
Nov 89 12640 215078 17.01566 344
Dec 89 9179 162690 17.72415 -3461
Jan 90 19181 364761 19.01679 10002
Feb 90 16595 308589 18.5953 -2586
Mar 90 19227 336971 17.52593 2632
Apr 90 17518 263914 15.0653 -1709
May 90 22498 301413 13.39732 4980
Jun 90 19060 235237 12.34192 -3438
Jul 90 30748 387979 12.61802 11688









inn in i i
500000
<T> <Tl <Jt Oi O) Ol CZ O O O O O O O
CD 03 A 00 00 00 03 CD Ol CO CT CD Cfi CH
! • o< 03
o « „ <o ^ a
z a -3 u. 2 < 2 ->
Quantity of oil $ Value of oil
Figure 3: U.S. Imports of Iraqi Crude Petroleum
2. Did Iraq Increase Imports of U.S Commodities?
The U.S. Department of Commerce publishes aggregate
commodity import and export statistics on a bi-annual basis.
This information, for the period January 1989 to June 1990, is











D Industrial Machinery, temp treatment
D Helicopters
D Machinery for molding inner tubes
D Pitch Pine Sawn Wood
D Plywood
D Machine parts for pneumatic tires
D Airplane/Helo Parts
D Additives for Lube Oil
D Surveying Instruments
D Air Compressors
D Special Purpose Vehicles
D Red Oak Wood
D Machines for working plastic/rubber
D Machinery for work material
D Parts filtering/purifying machinery
D Ref ridg/Freezer Parts
D Drill Bits
D Machines for Wire Working
D Air Condix Machinery w/ refridg unit
D Special Attachment for Machine Tools









































F Soybean Oil Cake
F Barley
F Beans
F Sunflower Seed Oil
F Cheddar Cheese
F Butter
F Birds' eggs for hatching





























F Sub-total 284484 305447 312864
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12 3
CAT COMMODITY JAN-JUN JUL-DEC JAN-JUN
___
1989 1989 1990
A Center Pivot Irrigation Equipment 50 4356 19674
A Irrigation Equipment 1827 3725
A Watermelon Seeds (for sowing) 1417
A Irrigation Coils 12799 680 1411
A Sub-total 12849 6863 26227
I Combed Wool in Fragments 4804 13202 14543
I Soil Pipe of Cast Iron 5575 6204
I Tallow 6500 5237 4914
I Pulp Fibrous Cellulosic Mat'l 4637
I Lube oil add petro/bituminous mineral 867 426 3920
I Preparations for Beverage Manufac 6485 3643
I Str wire w/o st cr not ftd w/ ftgs 3136
I Newsprint rolls/sheets 2040 2261
I Cattle Hides 1823 1884
I Chemical Wood Pulp (dissolving) 1797 3977 1833
I Machine Parts (manufac hot glass) 9 1868 1700
I Paper/Paperboard 1500
I Cultured Crystal 1174
I Machines to work formed material 1082
I Sub-total 20462 34148 52431
O Parts for oil and gas field machines 8817 9307 9709
O Oil/Gas Field Machines 3200
Oil Well Tubing 1690
Sub-total 8817 9307 14599
Total 350154 395799 640622
Legend
D - Dual Use industrial/military
I - Industry/Business
- Oil Industry related
F - Foodstuffs
A - Agricultural
The data indicate an overall increase in U.S.
commodity exports to Iraq of 13 percent from period 1 (January
to June 1989) to period 2 (July 1989 to December 1989) . A
significant (61 percent) increase occurred from period 2 (July
to December 1989) to period 3 (January - June 1990) .
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From 1982 to 1990, Iraq was one of the biggest buyers
of U.S. commodities. Rice and wheat were major U.S. exports
to Iraq. Iraq also purchased $5.5 billion in crops and
livestock with U.S. federally guaranteed loans and
agricultural subsidies. (Wines, 1990, p. Al) U.S. commodity
exports to Iraq are divided into five major categories. In
comparing the three periods, foodstuff export levels remained
fairly constant with modest gains of 7.4 percent and 2.4
percent, respectively. This could indicated that even if
Saddam Hussein anticipated sanctions, he did not believe the
U.S. would ever cut off humanitarian assistance to Iraq. He
would not need to stockpile food.
In contrast to agriculture, the largest export growth
occurred in the military/industrial dual use category, where
the change in exports from the first to the second half of
1989 rose from $23.5 billion to over $40 billion, a 70 percent
increase. The third period saw an even larger increase of 486
percent as Iraq increased purchases of many dual use
commodities including vehicles, aircraft, machinery parts and
air conditioning parts, wood, and medical equipment.
Increases between 50 percent and 70 percent were noted
in the Industry and Oil categories . Agricultural equipment
realized a gain in the second period; however, there were so




Although this thesis is primarily concerned with
financial transactions, it is worth mentioning that the U.S
Department of Commerce also tracks export licenses. Export
licensing policy toward Iraq evolved with overall U.S. foreign
policy. In 1982, the State Department deleted Iraq from the
list of terrorist supporting states. As a result, dual-use
items could be shipped to Iraq, except for goods that could
contribute to nuclear weapons development in Iraq or that
could be diverted to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe or the
Peoples Republic of China. Eight chemical weapon precursors
were added to export controls in 1984. In November 1984,
diplomatic relations with Iraq were resumed after a 17 year
suspension. In April 1987, export controls were expanded to
include ballistic missile developmental items. Later, in July
of that same year, exports to Iraq were further curtailed for
chemical precursors. Additional restrictions were added for
weapons-related chemical and biological agents at that time.
On 2 and 9 August 1990, President Bush issued Executive Orders
suspending all trade with Iraq. (U.S. Department of Commerce,
BXA Facts, undated, p. 1)
A brief review of the export licensing data, which
included only a numerical count and biannual tally of license
requests, showed a slight increase in the number of licenses
requested by Iraq. From January to June 1989, Iraq applied
for 112 licenses; from July to December 1989, Iraq applied for
129 licenses; and from January to July 1990, Iraq applied for
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131 licenses. Based solely on this count, it does not appear
that Iraq attempted to stockpile goods. (U.S. Department of
Commerce, BXA, 1990)
3. Did Iraq Transfer Money Out of U.S. Banks?
Two days before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, telexes
were sent by Iraq to correspondent banks in the Middle East
and Europe asking that they transfer funds from their Iraqi
accounts to the Central Bank of Jordan, according to Arab
sources quoted in the Washington Post . Allegedly, between
$100 million and $400 million was retrieved. Financial
analysts say the telexes were part of a feverish scramble by
Iraq to gather hard currency, gold and other liquid assets in
anticipation of international sanctions. (Frankel, 1990, p.
1)
In response to this Washington Post article, Alan
Greenspan stated that a Federal Reserve review of Iraqi and
Jordanian accounts in the United States indicated accounts
were at a modest level and did not show any unusual activity
during the days prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The
review found no evidence that Iraq transferred funds to the
Central Bank of Jordan. However, Greenspan admitted that the
data were not conclusive with respect to transfers involving
other institutions. Since account balances were low, even if
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Saddam Hussein anticipated sanctions, it probably was not
worth the risk of alerting the U.S. by moving money from
accounts
.
4. Did Iraq Sell U.S. Stocks and Bonds?
No information was obtained on this subject.
5. Did Iraq Increase Request for U.S. Loans?
Loan data lists quarterly aggregate bank claims
against Iraq. Data indicate that only a small number of U.S.
chartered banking organizations had claims on Iraq (U.S.
Congress, 13 Sep 1991, p. 187) . From September 1989 through
September 1990, Iraqi account balances remained steady (see
Tables 6 and 7) . In June 1990, 164 consolidated banks held
$614 million in total claims against Iraq, with $475 million
in bonds. Approximately $106 million were claims on public
borrowers; $33 million were claims on private non-bank
borrowers. After adjusting for guarantees by non-Iraqi
entities, Iraq only owed $112 million. (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Washington D.C. Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council Statistical Release, Country
Exposure Lending Survey, 1989-1990)
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Table 6: AMOUNTS OWED U.S. BANKS BY IRAQI BORROWERS
Claims by Quarter (Dollar figures in millions)
Date Total Guaranteed by others Owed minus
Owed Banks Public Others Guaranteed
Sep 8 9 421 196 67 158
Dec 89 440 301 8 19 112
Mar 90 557 320 122 21 112
Jun 9 614 399 102 1 112
Sep 90 440 330 1 109
Table 7: IRAQ CROSS BORDER AND NON-LOCAL CURRENCY CONTINGENT





















There is no direct evidence that the government of
Iraq attempted to obtain additional loans from the United
States just prior to invading Kuwait. In part, this may be
due to U.S. banking institutions' unwillingness to support an
uncreditworthy borrower and the 1989 discovery of over $5
billion worth of BNL loans to Iraq, far in excess of the
amounts BNL reported to the Federal Reserve.
6. Did Iraq Abruptly Cease Loan Payments?
Iraq was mostly current on U.S. debts; however, Iraq
was known as a poor credit risk throughout the rest of the
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world. Iraq was, at best, erratic on international loan
payments and played one creditor off another. Between 1988
and 1990, Iraq ceased debt service to France, stopped interest
payments on some Japanese loans and fell behind on some short
and medium term loan payments to Britain. (Hargreaves, 11 Aug
1990, p. 3) As late as June 1990, Iraq paid several million
pounds to Britain for long term loans (Hargreaves, 10 Aug
1990, p. 3) . Iraq did not pay $2.8 million to the World Bank
when it was due in July 1990 ( London Financial Times , 1990, p.
2) .
By August 1990, U.S. owned banks had over $100 million
exposed to Iraq (owed by Iraq but not solely guaranteed by
Iraq) (U.S. Congress, 1991, p. H847). On the date of the
invasion, Iraq defaulted on $2 billion of Commodity Credit
Corporation credits and $200 million on a credit program
through Exim-bank (guaranteed by the United States.) (U.S.
Congress, 1992, p. H6697) .
7. Did Iraq Attempt to Sell U.S. Business and Real Estate
Holdings?
The Iraqi direct investment position in the United
States was considered negligible ($1 million or less) during
the period 1980 to 1991. Direct investment is defined as
ownership or control by a foreign national of 10 percent or
more of the voting securities in incorporated U.S. business
enterprises, including equity and debt. The Department of
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Commerce does not even list Iraq in its normal statistical
reporting on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States.
Iraqi direct investments listed with the Commerce Department
included holdings in Saks Fifth Avenue (a department store)
,
an ice cream store, a floor covering store and a sporting
goods store. No information could be found on Iraqi real
estate holdings in the United States. No evidence was found
to suggest that Iraq attempted to sell its limited U.S.
business holdings. (U.S. Department of Commerce.
International Trade Administration, Various Editions)
F. TIMING
In considering the seven precautionary measures a country
could take to protect its assets from economic sanctions, the
question of timing must be considered. Some actions are
better suited to short term implementation (several weeks to
several days) . Other actions take longer to achieve (several
months to a year)
.
1 . Short Term
Three of the seven actions could have been completed
just days or weeks prior to the invasion of Kuwait because of
the nature and ease of certain transactions. Actions in this
category include: transferring money out of U.S. banks,
selling stocks and bonds and abruptly ceasing loan payments.
Waiting until the last minute would have enabled Saddam
Hussein not to tip his hand prior to taking action and could
also indicate that he did not plan the invasion of Kuwait very
far in advance
.
2 . Medium to Long Term
Four other actions would have taken longer to
accomplish and Saddam Hussein would have had to plan anywhere
from several months to a year in advance to fully achieve
these goals. If Saddam Hussein were interested in selling oil
to raise capital for purchasing war-related material, he would
have had to plan this far enough in advance to sell and ship
the oil, purchase the goods and then have them delivered to
Iraq. Several months may be considered an average timeframe
to accomplish these tasks. The same time lag also applies to
his ability to request and receive additional loans and
increase/receive imports. Selling Iraqi owned businesses and
real estate in the United States could also take from several
months to several years to achieve, depending on the market
demand.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This section determines whether Saddam Hussein anticipated
U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq, within the scope of the
data collection outlined earlier. Additionally, the question
of whether it is possible to track financial flows using
publicly available government sources is also addressed.
1. Did Saddam Hussein Anticipate Sanctions?
a. Evidence Suggesting Anticipation
(1) Iraq increased its sale of oil to the United
States by 61.3 percent between June and July 1990. While this
is not a definitive indicator that sanctions were expected, it
does indicate anomalous behavior.
(2) U.S. exports to Iraq increased in the year
before Iraq invaded Kuwait. It is unclear whether or not
increased U.S. exports, especially in the dual use
military/industry category, indicate pending military actions
since Iraq was still attempting to rebuild its infrastructure
after its long war with Iran.
(3) Conflicting information exists on the question
of whether Iraq transferred money out of U.S. banks prior to
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Alan Greenspan stated that
Iraqi-owned U.S. bank accounts were at a modest level and did
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not show any unusual activity immediately prior to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. However, press reporting indicated
telexes were sent by Iraq to correspondent banks in the Middle
East and Europe asking them to transfer funds from their Iraqi
accounts to the Central Bank of Jordan (CBS, 1992, p. 4).
b. Evidence Against Anticipation
(1) In a statement before Congress, R. Richard
Newcomb stated that most of the $1.2 billion of blocked Iraqi
assets consisted of bank deposits for purchases of Iraqi oil
already enroute to the United States (U.S. Treasury
Department, Newcomb, 1991) . This tends to suggest that Iraq
did not plan on or take seriously the threat of U.S. imposed
economic sanctions.
(2) No evidence was found to suggest that Iraq
increased its requests for U.S. loans just prior to invading
Kuwait. Loan payments on outstanding debts to the United
States were mostly current.
(3) Although the Iraqi direct investment position
in the United States was considered negligible, no evidence
was found to suggest that Iraq attempted to sell its limited
U.S. business holdings.
No information was obtained on Iraqi real estate,
stock or bond holdings in the United States.
c. Weighing the Evidence
Taking into account all the factors noted above,
both pro and con, it does not appear that Saddam Hussein
anticipated U.S. economic sanctions, or if he did, he may not
have taken the implicit threat seriously. One would expect
that a country anticipating sanctions would take positive
actions to protect its overseas financial interests. Such
actions would inevitably leave some discernable traces that
would appear in the banking and business statistics collected
by the U.S. government. However, during the course of this
study, no such evidence was positively identified. Any hints
or allegations that tend to suggest that Saddam Hussein
anticipated sanctions were accompanied by other plausible
explanations or were directly contradicted by other sources.
The limited scope of data availability and sources
used in this thesis may have precluded the identification of
evidence supporting the argument that Iraq anticipated and
attempted to circumvent sanctions in advance. Only after
expanding the scope of the data collection and analysis effort
can this question be answered definitively.
2. Is it Possible to Track Financial Flows?
Within the scope of data collection established for
this thesis, it was possible to track some Iraqi financial
flows in the United States. There are two problems that
precluded further data collection and analysis.
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First, current U.S. bank laws prohibit U.S. banks and
other financial institutions from revealing the names and
account balances of foreign account owners. This type of
information remains protected within the banking system and
reportedly is not readily shared by the Federal Reserve System
with other governmental agencies. While some argue that
revealing the names and amounts of holdings would make U.S.
investment opportunities less attractive to foreigners, there
are several reasons why this data should be shared within the
Government, in addition to the sanction tracking argument.
For example, more accurate disclosure and oversight may have
shed light on foreign ownership of U.S. banks and prevented
the BCCI banking scandal. BNL is another case in point where
illegal loans were easily hidden. The U.S. Government needs
to know how much foreign money is invested in this country,
not for the purpose of interference in free trade but to make
informed policy decisions.
Secondly, import/export, commodity and foreign
commercial investment data are not available in a format that
easily lends itself to analysis. Most data are produced and
reported on a quarterly or bi-annual basis. In order to
detect surges or declines in transactions, data collected by
U.S. banks and U.S. government agencies on selected foreign
governments and foreign individuals needs to be reported more




1. Expand this Thesis to Include Other Information
This thesis could be expanded to include other
categories of information; i.e., license requests, real estate
transactions, stock holdings, bond holdings, intelligence
documents and non-financial topics. On-line electronic pay
services (LEXUS/NEXUS and Dunn and Bradstreet) which contain
detailed information on finances should also be included in
future studies. This would provided a more balanced
examination of the questions. Another productive area for
study would be to investigate the actions of a government that
actually anticipated economic sanctions. Libya would be an
excellent choice to model how a government actually
circumvents sanctions.
2. Establish Centralized Data Base
All sources of financial and trade data collected by
the U.S. Government should be maintained in a central
location. Authorized Government users could have electronic
access to the data to perform economic or policy analysis.
Classification and privacy restriction considerations would
need to be incorporated into such a data base.
3 . Modeling
A model should be developed to support more effective
Government monitoring of foreign financial transactions within
the United States. Such a model, used in conjunction with a
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centralized database of financial and trade information, would
enable Government officials to spot trends, establish norms
and detect anomalies in a timely manner. This thesis provides
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2. DOES YOUR ORGANIZATION MAINTAIN OR HAVE ACCESS TO ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING TYPES OF INFORMATION:
A. Statistics related to the sale of Iraqi oil.
YES U-" NO
3. Iraqi Commodity transactions in the United States




C. Iraqi government bank accounts in the United States
( transfers /payments |
.
YES *^~ NO
D. Iraqi private citizen bank accounts in the United States
(over SI million) (transfers/payments).
YES NO Z^-—
E. Iraqi balance of trade payments.
YES NO L^~~




G. Iraqi government stock holdings/transactions in the United
States .
YES u^ NO
H. Iraqi private business stock holdings /transactions in the
United States.
YES NO l^—




J. Iraqi private business bond holdings/ transactions in the
United States.
YES NO L--—
K. Iraqi currency exchanges of over $1 million (from U.S.
dollars to Iraqi dinar or other foreign currency).
YES NO o*"~
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3. I? YOU ANSWERED YES TO ANY OF THE A30VS QUESTIONS 2 -A THROUGH
2-K, REQUEST YOU PROVIDE AVAILA3LE DATA ?CR THE PERIOD AUGUST 1339
THROUGH AUGUST 1990. ( 3ROXEN DOWN 3Y MONTH IF PCSSI3LE;.
4. IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO ANY OF THE A30VE QUESTIONS 2-A THROUGH
2-K -AND YDU ARE UNA31E TD PROVIDE THAT DATA, REQUEST YOU INCLUDE
THE REASONS THAT THE DATA DANNCT 3E RELEASED (FOR EXAMPLE, 5PECIFID
LAWS, REGULATIONS, OR ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES THAT PRECLUDE YDU
FROM SHARING THE INFORMATION).
23.






5. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS, DATA,
SOURCES OF INFORMATION, OR IDEAS YOU MAY HAVE THAT WOULD ASSIST ME
WITH THIS RESEARCH.
$MiM* of F<nU$r C^da C^IaJ /a* May 199/ fa ^faMu X-nc^uxi^.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY




This refers to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
dated August 3, 1992, for information on Iraqi financial










the Treasury regulations require that before a FOIA
ocessed, requesters need to state their agreement to
on the content of your letter, it appears that you
tegory for fee purposes of "all other requesters."
at you would be charged for search time in excess of
for duplication in excess of 100 pages. It is
t the search cost to you would be about $118.00. We
ching our registered account system and our TREASURY
ntry system.
I need to mention, however, that even if records you have
requested are found, they would be exempt from disclosure under
exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(4), which exempts financial information that is privileged
or confidential. It has long been the Treasury Department's
position that records relating to the purchase, ownership of, and
transactions in Treasury securities are held confidential.
In the commercial book-entry system, Federal Reserve Banks
maintain securities accounts on their records for the account of
various depository institutions. Those depository institutions
hold securities for other entities or individuals. The actual
beneficial ownership of the book-entry securities is reflected
only on the records of a financial institution or broker or
dealer. Neither the Treasury Department nor the Federal Reserve
Banks have records of ownership.
Sincerely,
I cK ^is-c-G-k*- \ p — - c SS










UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERC
International Trade Administration
Washington D C 20230




This is the United States Commerce Department's response to your
Freedom of Information Act (FOI) request, dated August 3, 1992,
requesting data on Iraqi financial transactions in the United
States during the period August 1989 through August 1990.
We have identified a variety of documents and statistical


























ed by the Department's Census Bureau include
ments to their press releases for the
d. They have also provided copies of pages
e Trade: Exports and General Imports by
bl icly avai lable for sale. An order form
included. The Census Bureau has provided








ave any questions on these documents, or
ests, contact Mr. Gary Austin and the Census
1-763-1244.
In light of your interest in data pertaining to Iraqi oil sales
and commodity transactions, I would suggest you contact the U.S.
Departments of Energy and Agriculture respectively for









DOCUMENTS RELEASED IN THEIR ENTIRETY
Economic Affairs
o Untitled page from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
International Trade Administration
o Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United
States, September 1989, IRAQ, prepared by the American
Embassy, Baghdad
o U.S. Trade with Near East/North African Countries, 1988,
1989, January-June 1989, 1990
o Table 8--Iraq: Leading U.S. General Imports (January- June
,
1990)
o Table 9--Iraq: Leading U.S. Total Exports, 1989 and
January-June 1989 and 1990 (2 pages)
o Table 9--Iraq: Leading U.S. General Imports (1985, 1986,
1987, 1988, 1989)
o Table 9--Iraq: Leading U.S. Domestic Exports (1985, 1986,
1987, 1988, 1989)
Census Bureau
o FT927/Annual 1989: U.S. Merchandise Trade
o FT927/Annual 1990: U.S. Merchandise Trade
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade August
1989 (dated October 18, 1989)
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade September
1989 (dated November 17, 1989)
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade October
1989 (dated December 18, 1989)
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade November
1989 (dated January 18, 1990)
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade December
1989 (dated February 20, 1990)
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade January




o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade February
1990 (dated April 19, 1990)
o FT900/Suppleraent : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade March
1990 (dated May 18, 1990)
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade April
1990 (dated June 18, 1990)
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade May 1990
(dated July 18, 1990~1
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade June 1990
(dated August 20, 1990)
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade July 1990
(dated September 19, 1990)
o FT900/Supplement : Report on U.S. Merchandise Trade August
1990 (dated October 19, 1990)
o U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S.
Foreign Trade Reports Order Form
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York







I am writing in response to your Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") request dated August 3, 1992, which the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (the "Bank") received on August 11,
1992.
The Bank is of the view that the disclosure provisions
of the FOIA do not apply to the Bank because the Bank does not
fall within the definition of an "agency" of the Federal Govern-
ment for purposes of the FOIA. However, under certain of its
internal rules, which are set forth in the Bank's Operating
Bulletin 39, the Bank complies with the spirit of the FOIA in
making information available to the public if disclosure would
not adversely affect (a) some legitimate public or private
interest intended to be protected by law and (b) would not impede
the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve System. Consistent with
its internal rules, the Bank has reviewed your request as if it
were a request subject to the FOIA. However, the treatment of
your request in this manner does not constitute an admission that
the Bank is an "agency" within the meaning of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552, or that the provisions of the FOIA are directly applicable
to the Bank.
You have requested the following:
In order to complete my research, I request your
assistance, under the Freedom of Information Act,
by completing the enclosed questionnaire and pro-
viding any available data on Iraqi financial trans-
actions during the period August 1989 through
August 199 0.
The first portion of your request is directed toward
the completion of a questionnaire regarding whether the Bank
"maintains or has access to" to certain specified commercial
information relating to the Iraqi government and "Iraqi private
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK_ Lieutenant Kim Kotlar
August 14, 1992
business." If the FOIA were directly applicable to the Bank, it
would not require the Bank to generate new documents or complete
documents on your behalf. See Assassination Archives & Research
Center v. C. I .A. . 720 F. Supp. 217, 219-20 (D.D.C. 1989) affirmed
925 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1991). As a consequence, the Bank hereby
declines to fulfill the first portion of your request.
The second portion of your request seeks "any avail-
able data on Iraqi financial transactions during the period
August 1989 through August 1990." In light of the extra-
ordinarily broad scope of this request, the attempt to locate
these records is unduly burdensome on this Bank and "unfairly
places the onus of non-production on the recipient of the request
and not where it belongs — upon the person who drafted such a
request." See Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services , 727 F. Supp. 35, 36 n.2 (D.Mass. 1989)
and American Federation of Gov't Employees v. Dept. of Commerce ,
907 F.2d 203, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In addition, your request
encompasses confidential account information which, if the FOIA
were directly applicable to the Bank, would be exempt from dis-
closure as confidential business or financial information. See
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(4). Therefore, the Bank is unable to make
the requested records available to you at this time.
You may appeal this determination by submitting a
written request for appeal to the Secretary of the Bank within
ten (10) business days of your receipt of this letter. The
President of this Bank or such officer or officers as he may
designate, will make a determination with respect to any such
appeal within (20) business days after its receipt, and will
notify the appealing party of the decision on the appeal.
If you have any questions regarding the disposition of
your FOIA request, your questions should be directed to Paul D.















Lt. Kim L. Kotlar
United States Navy
114 Spray Avenue
Monterey, CA 9 3 940
Dear Lt. Kotlar:
This is in response to your letter dated August 3, 1992,
received by the Board on August 11, 1992, in which you request,
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("Act"), 5 U.S.C.
§ 552, copies of "any available data on Iraqi financial
transactions during the period August 1989 through August 1990."
In addition, you request that the questionnaire which you
included be completed with respect to the availability of certain
information you seek at the Board. By letter dated August 25,
1992, the time period for our response to your request was
extended.
The Act does not require an agency to create records in
order to respond to FOIA requests. The FOIA does not require an
agency to answer questions presented in the form of FOIA
requests. Accordingly, we cannot provide you with the
information you request in the questionnaire.
The staff's search of Board records has revealed several
documents that are responsive to your request. Two of those
documents will be provided to you in their entirety. We have
determined, however, that the remaining documents contain the
following kinds of exempt information: commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential; and staff opinions, recommendations, and analyses
that would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency. Such information will be
withheld from you under authority of exemptions 4 and 5 of the
Act, respectively, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(4) and (b)(5). The
documents containing the exempt information have been reviewed in
accordance with the last sentence of subsection (b) of the Act,
and no reasonably segregable nonexempt information has been
identified.
Your request for information, therefore, is partially
granted and partially denied for the reasons stated above. All
94
- 2 -
documents being made available pursuant to this authorization
will be sent to you under separate cover. If you believe you
have a legal right to any information that is being withheld, you
may appeal this determination in accordance with section 261.9(d)
of the Board's Rules Regarding Availability of Information, a
copy of which is enclosed for your information.
Very truly yours,
William W. Wiles
Secretary of the Board
Enclosure
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BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Excerprs from the 5oard's Rules
Regarding Availability of Information
12 CFR Fart 261
Section 261.9(d)
(d) Appeal of denial of request for records— (1)
Request for review; time limits. Any person denied access
to Board records requested in accordance with this section
may file with the Board a written request for review of the
denial by the Board or Board member(s) designated to hear
such appeal. The request shall be filed within ten working
days of the date on which the denial was issued, or, where a
request for documents has been partially approved but access
to the documents has not been given, within ten working days
from the date such documents are transmitted to the
requester. The request shall prominently display the word
"appeal" on the first page. An initial request for records
may not be combined in the same letter with an appeal.
(2) Untimely appeals. The Board may consider an
untimely appeal if:
(i) It is accompanied by a written request for leave to
file an untimely appeal; and
(ii) The Board or designated Board member (s)
determines, in its discretion and for good and substantial
cause shown, that the appeal should be considered.
(3) Decision on appeal; time limits. The Board or
designated Board member (s) shall make a determination with
respect to any appeal within 20 working days of actual
receipt of the appeal by the Secretary and shall immediately
notify the appealing party of the determination and the
right to seek judicial review if the determination upholds,
in whole or in part, the denial of the request for records.
Such determination is not subject to review under Section
265.3 of this chapter which provides for review of actions
taken under delegated authority.
(4) Mootness of appeal, (i) The Board, a Board member,
or a staff person designated by the Chairman may declare an
appeal wholly or partially moot and instruct the Secretary
of the Board to reconsider the previous denial or to release
the requested documents, where a determination is made that
intervening circumstances or additional facts not known at
the time of denial have or may have eliminated any need or
justification for withholding the requested documents.
(ii) The Secretary may reconsider a denial being
appealed if such intervening circumstances or additional
facts come to the attention of the Secretary while an appeal
is pending.
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Effective July 11, 1988
The World Bank
INTERNATIONAL BANK FO RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
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I refer to your letter of August 3, 1992 requesting that we fill
questionaire and provide data on Iraq. As you know, the World Bank has not
had active relationship with Iraq since 1973. As a result, we regret that we
do not have data you are seeking. The answers to questions in your
questionaire are therefore all "no". I wish you luck with your research.
O Ci VAA^-^ '
Sawai Boonma
Senior Economist
Middle East and North Africa Region
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APPENDIX B
SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON IRAQ
[This Appendix is reproduced in its entirety from the
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "Economic
Issues Raised by the Sanctions Against Iraq," dated 11 April
1992.J
Shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the
U.N. and individual countries imposed comprehensive economic
sanctions on the Iraqi regime. These sanctions have remained
in place (albeit with some modifications) since the end of
operation Desert Storm (February 27, 1991) . A brief
description of the sanctions imposed by the U.N., the United
States, and the other major participants in the international
coalition opposing Iraq follows. 3
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS
3Unless otherwise indicated, this chronology draws from
Marjorie Ann Brown, Iraq-Kuwait: U.N. Security Council
Resolutions-Texts and Votes , CRS Report to Congress, no. 90-
513 F (Washing, DC: United States Library of Congress,
congressional Research Service, 4 December 1990); Marjorie
Ann Brown, Iraq-Kuwait: U.N. Security Council Resolutions
Texts and Votes— 1991 , CRS Report of Congress, no. 91-395 F
(Washington DC: United states Library of Congress,
congressional Research Service, 25 October 1991); Clyde R.
Mark, Iraq: U.S. Economic Sanctions , CRS Issue Brief, no.
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On Aug. 6, 1990, the U.N. Security Council passed
Resolution 661 imposing mandatory economic sanctions against
Iraq and Kuwait under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Under
the Resolution's terms, all trade in oil and other commodities
was banned as were new investments and any sales or supplies
of products including arms. Only medical supplies and food
were exempted and then only for humanitarian reasons. A U.N.
Sanctions Committee was also established. 4
Resolution 665
On Aug. 25, 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution
661 authorizing the United States and other states deploying
naval forces in the Gulf area to use these forces to enforce
the embargo.
Resolution 666
On Sept. 13, 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution




On Sept. 25, 1990, the Security Council decided that the
blockade also encompassed air traffic unless flights were for
humanitarian reasons. United States and other allied air
forces enforced this ban. The resolution also warned that
sanctions might be imposed against U.N. member states whose
citizens violated the Iraq embargo. 5
Food Export Sanctions Eased
Following the conclusion of the ground war on Feb. 27
1991, the U.N. Sanctions Committee agreed on March 23 to ease
sanctions on the export of food to Iraq in the wake of reports
of widespread postwar suffering and food shortages in Iraq.
4Under U.N. Resolution 669 of Sept. 24, 1990, the
Security council charged the Sanctions Committee with
responsibility for determining whether assistance should be








By the end of 1991, more than 30 countries reportedly notified
the Committee that they would send 5.4 million tons of food. 6
Resolution 687
The cease-fire resolution passed by the Security Council on
April 3, 1991 confirmed that sanctions would not be lifted
until Iraq had complied with all cease-fire terms. The
embargo on food exports to Iraq was lifted but other sanctions
were maintained subject to bi-monthly review and with
exceptions for humanitarian reasons. On June 11, the Security
Council reconfirmed its decision to maintain sanctions.
Unfreezing of Iraqi Assets
On May 9, 1991, the U.N. Sanctions Committee unanimously
agreed to the unfreezing of Iraqi assets to pay for essential
civilian items. In June 1991 the Sanctions Committee
authorized 31 countries to release frozen Iraqi assets if Iraq





Guidelines for an international arms embargo against Iraq
were adapted by the Security Council on June 17, 1991.
Resolutions 706 and 712
On Aug. 15, 1991, the Security Council authorized a U.N.
sale of $1.6 billion of Iraqi oil in order to purchase
medicine and foodstuffs to be distributed by the U.N. The
Resolution was passed in the wake of the July 15 release of a
report by the U.N. Inter-agency Humanitarian Program for Iraq
and Kuwait urging that Iraq be permitted to sell some of its
oil and spend currently frozen assets in order to pay for
humanitarian needs. Security Council Resolution 712 of Sept.
19 implemented the planned sale, although Iraq has not agreed
to the resolution's terms. The Security Council refused the
Secretary General's recommendation that Iraq be permitted to
6Paul Lewis, "U.N. Says Hussein Is Most Responsible for
Travail in Iraq," The New York Times , 6 Feb. 1992, p. A10.
7Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Future Policy Options , CRS Report
for Congress, no. 91-896 F (Washington, DC: Library of




sell an additional $800 million of oil to prevent what U.N.




On Oct. 11, 1991 the Security Council passed a resolution
barring Iraq from pursuing any atomic programs, including
civilian programs. Only limited exceptions permitted use of
low-level isotopes for medical, industrial, and research
purposes. The resolution also mandated regular intrusive
inspections in Iraq for as long as Saddam remained in power. 8
Iraqi Oil-Sale Monitoring Plan
On Oct. 15, 1991 the U.N. Sanctions Committee announced
procedures for monitoring Iraqi oil sales pursuant to
Resolution 712. U.N. appointed monitors and U.N. staff were
to oversee Iraqi oil sales and purchasing of food and
medicine. Funds used in these transactions were to go into e
U.N. escrow account. 9 Iraq continued to refuse to agree to
the plan.
Security Council Retains Sanctions
On Feb. 5, 1992, the Security Council decided to maintain
sanctions, charging that Iraq was not observing the cease-fire
terms . 10
UNITED STATES SANCTIONS
Immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the United
States also initiated sanctions against Iraq. On Aug. 2,
1990, President Bush, under authority of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, issued Executive Orders 12722
and 12723 which, in addition to instituting a total embargo on
all U.S. trade with Iraq, also froze all Iraqi end Kuwaiti
assets in U.S. banks and prohibited any U.S. loans, credits,
or grants . Medical supplies and food for humanitarian
purposes were exempt from the embargo. On Aug. 9, two
8
"U.N. Council Bans Iraqi Atomic Programs," Facts on




superseding Executive Orders (nos. 12724 end 12725) brought
U.S. sanctions into conformity with U.N. Resolution 661. n
On Aug. 11, the United States announced that it would enforce
a naval blockade against Iraq. This was followed by Secretary
of State Baker's announcement on Aug. 12 that the exiled
Kuwaiti government had formally requested U.S. assistance in
enforcing the sanctions under the self-defense provision in
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. On Aug. 29, President Bush
announced an "action plan" whereby coalition members would
share the costs of possible military intervention, of
blockading Iraq, and of assisting front-line states bordering
Iraq and those states adversely affected by the embargo. By
Sept. 23, nearly $21 billion was committed to the plan by




EUROPEAN, SOVIET, ARAB, AND JAPANESE SANCTIONS
On Aug. 4, 1990 the European Community announced an
embargo of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil imports, the freezing of
Iraqi assets, an embargo of arms sales to Iraq, and suspension
of scientific, technical, and military agreements with Iraq.
On Aug. 13, the United Kingdom, followed by France on Aug. 19,
announced that their naval forces in the Gulf were ordered to
enforce the embargo. Belgium, Italy, Greece, Spain, and the
Netherlands all announced that they would contribute naval
forces on Aug. 20-21. On Sept. 5, West Germany said that it
would not contribute to President Bush's "burdensharing plan"
but instead would supply planes and ships to transport U.S.
troops to the region. 13
On Aug. 7, Turkey and Saudi Arabia closed oil pipelines
through which Iraq ships a significant share of its oil
production. On Aug. 2, the Soviet Unions suspended weapons
shipments to iraq. Japan, on Aug 5 banned Iraqi oil imports,
uHarry L. Clark and Keith A. Matthews, "Iraq/Kuwait
Sanctions: Trade Relations on a War Footing," International
Lawyer , vol. 25 (Summer 1991), pp. 391-92, 394-95 and




, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
History
, pp. 28 8, 2 96.
13 Ibid
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froze economic aid and investment, and embargoes trade. On
Sept. 13, Japan announced that it would contribute an
additional $3 billion in aid to the alliance effort of which
$1 billion would be for the multinational forces and $2
billion would go to assist front-line states. 14 In addition,
the People's Republic of China and Brazil, two important
suppliers of arms to Iraq, also suspended arms sales in early
August and Switzerland, although not a U.N. member, announced
that it would join the embargo.
14 Ibid., pp. 287-89.
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APPENDIX C
DATA COLLECTION WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
A . BACKGROUND
Today there are at least 20 federal departments or
agencies collecting statistical data and other information on
foreign investment in the United States. (GAO-NSIAD-90-25,
1989, p.l) . The primary governmental organizations (excluding
intelligence groups) are identified. A brief description of
data they collect and produce is also provided. General data
limitations are presented first. A summary of organizations
























Figure 4: Government Data Collection Chart
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B. LIMITATIONS
Congressional, Government Accounting Office (GAO) , and
Federal Reserve reports levy much criticism on the
government's current financial data collection and reporting.
One congressional report noted, "There is a paucity of
reliable data related to foreign investment here." This is
because the United States imposes fewer restrictions on
foreign investment than any other nation and has no formal
mechanism for screening investments. (Spenser, 1988, pp. ix-
29)
GAO reports indicate that there is some duplication of
data collected by various agencies while the federal
government has no central repository to track and store all
information needed to analyze foreign investment in the United
States. Additionally, GAO finds some data is considered
confidential, not routinely available to other federal
agencies, is two or more years old when published and lacks
sufficient detail to analyze specific industry sectors. (GAO-
NSIAD-90-25, 1989, pp. 1-2)
Although the Federal Reserve Board disputed one harsh
finding, Susan J. Tolchin, author of Buying Into America ,
alleged, "Some experts believe at least 50 percent of all
foreign investment goes unreported." She blames this on lax
reporting requirements, hidden ownership and other
circumventions of the law. (Tolchin, 1988, p. 9)
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In large part, data accuracy depends on voluntary
compliance with the law. While a few cases have been brought
to trial, enforcement is difficult and has been limited to
prosecuting cases of voluntary disclosure. There is little
investigation of those who have failed to disclose
information
.
In the banking sector, foreign-owned financial
institutions generally must comply with the same laws and
regulations and have the same rights and privileges as U.S.
banks (Spenser, 1988, p. 52) . This includes protection under
the Right to Financial Privacy Act 1978 which shields customer
records maintained by certain financial institutions from
improper disclosure to officials or agencies of the federal
government. It should be noted that requests from
intelligence agencies and the secret service are exceptions to
this law. (Fischer, undated, pp. 13-23)
C . SOURCES
1 . The Banking Sector
There are several types of banking organizations
foreigners can own in the United States. Specific reporting
requirements depend on the organization's primary regulatory
authority (Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve,
or the FDIC) . In most cases, the Federal Reserve acts as the
agent for the U.S. Treasury and Comptroller of the Currency.
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The Federal Reserve requires each foreign bank with a
subsidiary, branch or agency in the United States to file an
"Annual Report of Foreign Banking Organizations." This
includes the bank's parent's financial statements which are
available to the public. Other information about related
foreign companies, directors' earnings, hidden reserves, loan
loss experience and other sensitive items can be disclosed by
banks in a non-public confidential report called the "Foreign
Banking Organization Confidential Report on Operations."
Another confidential report is the "Report of Inter-company
Transactions for Foreign Bank Holding Companies and Their U.S.
Bank Subsidiaries." This quarterly report monitors transfers
of assets and foreign exchange transactions between the U.S.
bank subsidiaries and foreign banking organizations.
The Federal Reserve also collects information on the
balance sheets of American-based banks (foreign and
domestically-owned)
.
The most important document is the
quarterly "Report of Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches
and Agencies of Foreign Banks." This computerized data is
maintained by the FDIC and is available to the public.
Several other reports must be filed by banks and sent
to the Federal Reserve. The international capital series of
monthly and quarterly reports provide information on assets
and liabilities due from/to foreign countries or persons.
Foreign currency monthly reports discuss positions in certain
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key currencies. (GAO-NSIAD-90-25, 1989, pp. 15-16) (FED-401,
1991, pp. 11-14)
The Federal Reserve Bulletin, the Country Exposure
Report and the Country Exposure Lending Survey are reports
that contain the aggregate output of the data collected from
the banking sector. (FED, 1986, pp. 690-691)
The U.S. Treasury Department is also involved in
gathering information on banking. Treasury maintains a
financial data base to collect information from the following
banking reports, "Currency and Monetary Instrument Report",
"Currency Transaction Report" and "Foreign Bank Account
Report." This data may be disclosed to federal, state and
local law enforcement agencies to assist in law enforcement
efforts. (Fischer, undated, pp. 4-7)
The U.S. Treasury Department is responsible for
collecting information on foreign portfolio and direct
investment. The Office of Data Management in the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of International Affairs, compiles
data on portfolio investment from monthly or quarterly data
reported by financial intermediaries. This information is
compiled by country and type of investor in U.S. equities,
bonds and foreign funds held in banks. It is input to
Treasury's International Capital Reporting System and
published in quarterly Treasury Bulletins in aggregate form to
protect individual investors' privacy. The Treasury's Office
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of Thrift Management collects data on foreign investors
interest in U.S. savings and loan companies.
2. The U.S. Department of Commerce
The U.S. Department of Commerce is charged with
collecting information on foreign business activity and
foreign direct investment in the United States (data on
portfolio investment is maintained by the Treasury Department)
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990, p. 29). The International
Trade Administration (ITA), the Census Bureau and the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) are mainly involved in data
collection and publication for the Department of Commerce. Of
note, the Foreign Direct Investment and International
Financial Data Improvements Act of 1990 tasks the Department
of Commerce with preparing an annual report addressing the
"history, scope, trends, market concentration and effect on
the U.S. economy of foreign direct investment." This
legislation also allows statistical data to be shared among
some federal agencies. (GAO-NSIAD-92-107, 1992, p. 2)
The International Trade Administration (ITA) tracks
foreign acquisition, new plant construction, increases in
equity, joint ventures, and commercial real estate purchases.
No governmental organization tracks private real estate
investments. Information is culled from public sources, trade
journals and newspapers (Spenser, 1988, p. 30) . ITA lists
names of foreign investors and identifies specific investments
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but does not provide summary statistics on the amount of
investment by country or industry. ITA reports are not
considered comprehensive because they are based solely on
public reporting. (GAO-NSIAD-90-25, 1989, p. 9)
The Census Bureau maintains detailed but confidential
data on the operations of individual U.S. domestic and
foreign-owned businesses such as individual factories. This
information is contained in the computerized Standardized
Statistical Establishment files and is derived from IRS and
Census Bureau data. Foreign ownership is not highlighted in
reporting. (GAO-NSIAD-90-25, 1989, p. 9) (Spenser, 1988, p.
32) (GAO-NSIAD-92-107, 1992, p. 2)
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) tracks foreign
ownership based on data reported by consolidated business
enterprises (not individual businesses) (GAO-NSIAD-92-107,
1992, p. 2) . However, since data are based on individual
responses to mandatory reporting, only aggregate data are
released (Spenser, 1988, p. 30)
.
BEA conducts and reports on four major surveys. The
"Foreign Direct Investment Position and Balance of Payment
Flows" measures flows of capital, income, fees, royalties and
service transactions between foreign parent companies and U.S.
affiliates. "U.S. Business Enterprises Acquired or
Established by Foreign Direct Investors" includes outlays made
annually by foreign investors to establish or obtain new U.S.
affiliates. "Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S." details
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operations of U.S. affiliates of foreign companies including
the value of total assets at year end, balance sheet items,
sales of goods and services and research and development
expenditures. The most comprehensive BEA report is the
"Benchmark Survey of Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S."
This report compiles information contained in the previously
discussed reports (down to the $1 million investment level)
but it is published only once every five years. (GAO-NSIAD-
90-25, 1989, p. 6)
BEA and the Census Bureau are now allowed to share
information on foreign ownership of U.S. businesses and real
estate. (CRS, 1992, p. 5) Improved coordination should
improve the overall quality of data; however, release of
information will still be at the aggregate level due to
confidentiality restrictions (GAO-NSIAD-92-107, 1992, p. 31) .
3 . Others
Numerous governmental organizations are involved in
tracking foreign business dealings in the United States. For
example, the Department of Agriculture collects data on
foreign direct investment in agricultural land. Annual
reports are issued on foreign ownership by region, parcel size
and method of acquisition. Foreign investors are required to
report holdings if annual gross receipts exceed $1000. (GAO-
NSIAD-90-25, 1989, p. 10)
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires
extensive public disclosure and reporting of ownership in
publicly held U.S. companies. Any United States or foreign
holder with more than five percent interest in a public U.S
company's shares must disclose its holdings to the SEC. (GAO-
NSIAD-90-25, 1989, p. 17) Foreign companies operating in the
United States are also required to register with the SEC.
Again, much of this data is protected and not reported
publicly due to privacy laws.
The Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, follows foreign investment, energy operations
and financial performance in U.S. energy enterprises. The
Department of Energy uses corporate annual reports, ITA
reports, 10K reports filed with the SEC, public sources and
industry contacts to provide an annual summary to Congress.
(Spenser, 1988, p. 32) (GAO-NSIAD-90-25, 1989, p. 12)
The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for
assuring domestic production of needed goods including U.S.
industrial base capabilities. DoD is also responsible for
protecting classified technology and accomplishes this through
the DOD Industrial Security Program. The Defense Industrial
Network (DINET) is one information system used to track
pertinent data. (GAO-NSIAD-90-25, 1989, p. 13)
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